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ABSTRACT 
 
This study aims to test if investor sentiment affects stock returns in the Finnish stock 
market. Previous research suggests a negative relationship between sentiment and 
subsequent returns on stocks that are considered speculative. As the behavioral theories 
suggest that individual investors are more likely to be subjects to sentiment and act on 
noise, it is presumable that small stocks, commonly held by individual investors, are 
more prone to shifts in sentiment. I test whether two confidence measures have an 
impact on stock returns in Finland, and whether the impact differs between speculative 
stocks and large bond-like stocks. Additionally, I aim to distinguish the irrational part of 
sentiment from the sentiment measures and test its possible effects on stock returns.  
 
Investor sentiment and its possible effects on stock returns have been widely discussed 
in the finance literature. Classical finance assumes that majority of investors are rational 
utility maximizers who make unbiased estimations about stock returns, and that possible 
misvaluations are quickly corrected by rational arbitrageurs. Thus, stock prices are 
unpredictable, valued in accordance with their fundamentals, and always fully reflect all 
available information in markets. Behavioral finance challenges this view by arguing 
that psychological and sociological have an important role in the way that investors 
behave in the markets. Previous findings suggest that investor sentiment may play a role 
in security market under- and overreactions.  
 
I find that contemporaneous changes in both sentiment measures are positively related 
to stock returns. Especially indices consisting of small stocks are subjects to shifts in 
sentiment. Changes in both sentiment indices have only weak forecasting power on the 
returns of the stock indices. Irrational sentiments show significantly negative effects on 
subsequent stock returns, but the explanatory power of sentiment is relatively trivial. In 
addition, I find no evidence that the irrational sentiment would primarily affect 
speculative stocks. 
 
KEYWORDS: Behavioral finance, Investor sentiment, Overreaction 
  
 
 9   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Investor sentiment has been a widely discussed topic in the field of finance for decades. 
In classical finance the sentiment does not play any part, while stock prices reflect the 
discounted value of expected cash flows and irrational pricing is quickly washed away 
by rational arbitrageurs. However, from the behavioral finance perspective, waves of 
irrational sentiment, for example overly optimistic or pessimistic expectations, can be 
influential enough to affect asset prices for significant periods of time. There exists no 
common consensus among academics on how sentiment should be defined. According 
to DeLong et al. (1990) sentiment is a formation of beliefs about future cash flows and 
investment risks that are not justified by the facts at hand. Baker and Wurgler (2006), on 
the other hand, see investor sentiment as a propensity to speculate. Brown and Cliff 
(2002) state that “sentiment intuitively represents the expectations of market 
participants relative to a norm: a bullish (bearish) investor expects returns to be above 
(below) average, whatever average may be“ (2002: 2).   
 
Investor sentiment is closely related to the concept of noise trading introduced by Black 
(1986). He asserts that some investors trade on a “noisy” signal that is not related to 
fundamentals, and that these “noise traders” cause prices to deviate from their intrinsic 
values. Behavioral theories suggest that psychological and sociological factors play an 
important role in investors’ decision making process and hence in price formation. 
According to behavioral finance, securities’ expected returns are determined by rational 
risk factors as well as investor misvaluation. (Hirsleifer 2001: 1). Misvaluations appear 
in the form of over- and underreactions to new information. The empirical findings 
seem to suggest short-term return continuations and long-term returns reversals, which 
are against the idea of random walk in stock prices.  
 
Literature regarding the effects of sentiment is controversial. Most studies find that high 
sentiment, in other words, superfluous optimism is negatively related to subsequent 
stock returns. It has been suggested that the negative effect is a sign of initial 
overreaction, which is followed by a correction to fundamental prices. This negative 
impact of sentiment has shown to be especially pronounced for stocks that are hard to 
value and arbitrage. In contrast, some research suggests that sentiment has a stronger 
impact on returns of large and value stocks. These contradictions may be due to the fact 
that there exists no precise definition, nor measure for sentiment. Hence, the use of 
different sentiment measures in studying the impacts of sentiment may result in 
alternating results. Moreover, as sentiment is closely related to behavioral biases and 
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these biases differ among cultures, the effects of sentiment might differ between 
countries.  
 
In previous research a vast repertory of sentiment measures has been suggested. In this 
study I test whether the survey measures of Consumer Confidence and Economic 
Sentiment affect stock returns. Qui & Welch (2006) and Lemmon & Portniquina (2006) 
suggest that consumer confidence measures are strongly related to other measures of 
sentiment and play a significant role in financial market pricing.  
 
1.1. Purpose, scope and contribution 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the effects of investor sentiment on stock returns in 
the Finnish stock market during 2001-2014. I test, whether the chosen sentiment 
measures have an impact on aggregate stock market returns (OMXH-index) in Finland. 
In accordance with previous research (Fisher & Statman 2003) a negative relationship 
between sentiment measures and subsequent aggregate stock market returns is expected. 
Hence, the first hypothesis is: 
 
H1:  Consumer Confidence Index and Economic Sentiment Indicator have a negative 
impact on subsequent aggregate stock market returns in Finland. 
 
More specifically, this study aims to answer the question whether stocks that are 
considered speculative (e.g. small and growth stocks) are more sensitive to sentiment in 
contrast to large value stocks. Previous studies suggest that retail investor sentiment 
primarily affects small stocks as they are disproportionally held by small investors. 
Thus, firm size is a natural variable to use when studying the relationship between 
sentiment and stock returns. In addition, small stocks are usually less liquid compared 
to large stocks, which enhances the impact of sentiment on their returns. The second 
hypothesis is as follows 
 
H2: The impact of Consumer Confidence Index and Economic Sentiment Indicator is 
stronger for stocks considered more speculative compared to bond-like stocks.  
 
Previous research [Lemmon & Portinaquina (2006), Chen (2011), Kholdy & Sohrabia 
(2014)] suggests that investor sentiment is formed on the basis of rational and irrational 
factors. In this study both survey measures of sentiment are controlled by several 
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macroeconomic factors in order to separate the irrational components of sentiment. 
After that the impacts of irrational sentiment (adjusted sentiment) on stock returns is 
tested. Brown and Cliff (2006) and Lemmon & Portinaguina (2006) document that 
prices of speculative stocks tend to be negatively related to lagged sentiment and this 
negative relationship is suggested to reflect corrections to an initial overreaction of 
investors. I observe whether the stock prices in Finland show similar behavior. Hence, 
the third hypothesis is: 
 
H3: The adjusted sentiments have a stronger negative impact on subsequent returns of 
stocks that are considered speculative compared to returns of bond-like stocks. 
 
Consumer confidence index and Economic sentiment indicator are used as proxies for 
sentiment in this study, as prior research suggests that confidence measures are closely 
related to investors’ market expectations. The predictive power of sentiment on various 
index returns is tested using a linear regression approach. This study contributes to the 
previous literature in that the effect of sentiment on stock returns is studied in the 
Finnish stock market. Moreover, to my knowledge the measures of Consumer 
Confidence Index (CCI) and Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) have not been used as 
measures for sentiment in Finnish stock markets before. Most previous literature 
regarding investor sentiment focuses on U.S. stock markets. U.S. stock markets differ 
from Finnish markets in their magnitude but also in the proportion of retail investors. In 
U.S, households own approximately 38% of the equity market (The Goldman Sachs 
Group. Inc. 2013), whereas in Finland, household ownership sums up to approximately 
22% (Euroclear Finland 2015). As previous research shows that retail investors are most 
likely to be affected by sentiment, it is presumable that there are differences in the 
magnitude of the effect of sentiment depending on the country. Lehman, Chiu & 
Schaller (2004) suggest that cultural differences might also have a significant role for 
the relative strength of behavioral biases between countries.  
 
1.2. Structure of the study 
The purpose, scope and hypotheses of the study are introduced in the first chapter. 
Chapter two covers the theoretical background of the subject and introduces the 
differences between neoclassical finance and behavioral finance approach. Chapter 
three gives an overview on previous research regarding investor sentiment and its 
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effects on stock returns. Chapter four covers the data and methods used in this study. 
Chapter five discusses the research results and the last chapter concludes the findings. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Market efficiency 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), first introduced by Eugene Fama, claims that 
security prices fully reflect all available information when trading and information costs 
are zero. When new information arises, news spread rapidly and is incorporated in the 
prices without delay. (Fama 1970: 383–384). Hence, changes in stock prices represent 
the efficient discounting of new information and stock price is based on the expected 
present value of its dividends, using a constant discount rate (West 1988: 37). If there is 
incremental risk associated to the expected cash flow, a rational investor will require 
extra return to compensate for the risk (Martson & Harris 1993: 117). In efficient 
markets, a large number of well informed, profit maximizing investors do their best 
trying to forecast future market values of individual stocks. This competition among 
investors results in a situation where actual prices of individual assets already reflect not 
only the information based on past events, but also events that markets expect to take 
place in future. Thus, in efficient markets, price of a security is an accurate estimate of 
its fundamental value at any given time. (Fama 1995: 76). EMH consists of three forms; 
the weak form of market efficiency implies that all historical price information is fully 
reflected in present prices. The second, semi strong form, implies that prices also reflect 
all public information whereas the third, strongest form, states that prices reflect all 
information, including inside information. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2009: 349, 359.)  
 
EMH is closely connected to the theory of random walk, which implies that past history 
of stock price series cannot be used to predict future prices of stocks in any relevant 
way. In other words, stock prices have no memory and the price level of a security 
should not be more predictable than a series of cumulated random numbers (Fama 1995: 
76). As all relevant information is incorporated into stock prices immediately and 
consecutive price changes are independent, it is impossible for an investor to make a 
strategy based on technical trading rules that would increase his expected gains (Malkiel 
2003: 59). Random walk theory also challenges investment strategies based on 
company fundamentals. If the theory of random walk holds and if markets are 
information efficient, there are no additional gains to be made based on the analysis of 
company fundamentals. As stock prices already reflect all relevant information, a 
possibility for an investor to earn additional earnings only arises, when he or she has 
new information about the stock. If the trader has no inside information or other 
 14   
 
proprietary information regarding the stock, he or she may as well choose a stock 
portfolio through a random selection. (Fama 1995: 80.) 
 
Market efficiency can be tested using asset pricing models that provide an explanation 
between risk and asset returns. The most well-known model is the capital asset pricing 
model (Sharpe 1964, Litner 1965), which is based on the Markowitz mean-variance 
efficiency model. In this model investors are assumed to be risk-averse with one-period 
investment horizon, and to care only about expected returns and the variance of returns 
(risk). Risk averse individuals value a gamble in accordance with its expected return. 
The risk of an investment is measured by beta, which is the covariance of asset returns 
with the market returns relative to variance of the market. Additionally, all investors are 
assumed to have identical assumptions about the distributions of the returns. Investors 
choose efficient portfolios with given variances based on their individual risk aversion 
(Fama & French 2004: 49-50). Thus, an investment decision is made so that it 
maximizes the expected utility of wealth for the investor (Black 1986: 534). Under the 
standard theory of expected utility, an investor who has to allocate his or her wealth 
between a safe and a risky asset, will buy some of the asset if the expected (present) 
value is larger than the price of the asset. Contrariwise, the investor will sell the asset 
short if the expected value is less than the current price.  
 
As seen above, efficient market theory is based on several assumptions on investor 
behavior in markets. According to efficient market theory, investors learn to make 
correct judgments about the influence of new information on the probability distribution 
of potential stock returns. (Brown et al.  1998: 355.) However, in an uncertain world, it 
is very difficult to determine the exact fundamental value of a security, and 
disagreement always exists among market participants. According to Fama (1995) this 
disagreement gives rise to discrepancies between actual prices and fundamental values. 
Although discrepancies exist, competition among rational market participants causes 
stock prices to wander randomly around their fundamental values (1995: 76). Efficient 
market theory does recognize that some investors might not be fully rational, and that 
actions of these irrational investors could cause prices to deviate from their fundamental 
values. However, in the case of mispricing, rational, well informed investors – or 
‘arbitrageurs’, will quickly observe the mispricing and drive prices back to their 
fundamental levels (Delong et. al 1990: 704).  Moreover, classical finance sees that 
overpricing of stocks is as common as underpricing, making them a chance result.  
 
 
 15   
 
2.2. Behavioral Finance 
By the start of the twenty-first century, efficient market theory has lost some of its 
popularity among academics. Research has shown that stock prices tend to violate the 
theory on random walk and can be predicted to at least some extent.  Behavioral finance 
takes a wider, social science perspective in studying financial markets and argues that 
psychological and sociological factors have an important role in explaining some 
financial phenomena that rational financial models are not able to explain (Shiller 2003: 
83). Behavioral finance disregards the traditional assumptions of rationality and utility 
maximizing investors and uses broader-minded models in studying financial markets 
(Ritter 2003: 429). Behavioral finance is based on two building blocks: cognitive 
psychology and limits to arbitrage. Cognitive psychology refers to people’s mental 
processes whereas limits to arbitrage refers to forecasting the circumstances in which 
arbitrage forces will be powerful and in which they will not be. Behavioral finance is 
interested in the systematic errors in investors’ metal processes that cause individuals to 
act irrationally in the markets.  
 
As opposed to efficient market theory, behavioral finance asserts that investors act 
irrationally to the extent that they cause misvaluations in financial markets. Moreover, 
due to impediments in short selling, arbitrageurs are not always able to step in and drive 
stock prices back to their fundamentals (Ritter 2003: 430.) Hirshleifer (2001) states that 
the arbitrage argument of classical finance has two sides: The same way that rational 
investors arbitrage the mispricing away, irrational investors arbitrage away efficient 
pricing as well. Miller (1997) states that in the markets with little or no short-selling, an 
optimistic minority of investors can drive the price of a given security up, since they are 
the ones who set the demand for the particular security. Additionally, due to some 
overpowering cognitive tasks, which efficiency would require, all investors might be 
irrational in some respects (Hirshleifer 2001: 1536.) The next section introduces some 
of the most well-known psychological biases and their possible consequences for asset 
pricing.  
 
2.2.1. Psychological biases 
 
A large body of evidence from cognitive psychology experiments shows that people 
tend to repeat patterns in their behavior. Behavioral finance suggests that heuristics have 
in important role in investors’ decision making processes. Heuristics can be defined as  
rules of thumb that makes judging a likelihood easier, when the use of cognitive 
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resources is limited. Although rules of thumb can be useful in some tasks, applying 
them in a wrong context can result in harmful biases. Psychological research has shown 
that people tend to have similar heuristics and may also be subject to similar biases. 
Thus, although rational finance theories assume that irrational investors do not affect 
market prices as their trades cancel each other out, it is possible that a common bias 
among a large amount of investors is influential enough to move stock prices from their 
fair values (Hirshleifer 2001).  
 
Overconfidence refers to the fact that people overestimate their own abilities in several 
contexts. Psychological evidence shows that overconfidence is more predominant in 
tasks which require judgment and from which the feedback is delayed, in contrast to 
more mechanical tasks from which the feedback is received immediately. Thus it can be 
assumed that overconfidence would be present in security valuation, where judgments 
about uncertain future outcomes are required and feedback is not received immediately 
(Daniel, Hirshleifer & Subrahmanyam 1998: 1884). Daniel et al. (1998) argue that 
investors overestimate their own capabilities in valuing securities and underestimate 
their forecast error.  Investors who believe that their valuations of securities are more 
accurate than they actually are, trade more compared to rational investors. Odean (1998) 
finds confirming evidence and shows that overconfident investors trade more compared 
to others and suffer from excessive trading costs, which in turn lowers their expected 
utility (1998: 1916.)  
  
If over-confident investors fail more than they expect to, one could assume that these 
investors would learn out of overconfident behavior.  Biased self-attribution is seen as 
an important tumbler in people’s learning process, and hence a booster for 
overconfidence. Self-attribution bias occurs when people take the credit for past success 
and blame external factors for failure. Daniel et al. (1998) suggest that due to self-
attribution bias, investor confidence rises when public information is in line with the 
investor’s private information, but falls only modestly when public information 
contradicts private information. This suggests that among overconfident investors new 
public information can result in further overreaction to foregoing private signal (1998: 
1842).  Self-deception, which is a tendency to grow attachment to activities one has 
spent resources on, also enhances overconfidence.  According to the self-deception 
theory, people tend to adjust their attitudes to match past decisions in a way that 
reassures them of their skillful decision making. (Hirsleifer 2001: 11.) 
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Shefrin and Statman (1985) identify that investors have a tendency to hold on to poorly 
performing stocks for too long, and sell winning stocks too early. This tendency is 
called a disposition effect. Self-deception may be a partial explanation for disposition, 
since realizing losses would indicate a low decision making ability of the investor. 
Thus, by holding on to a poorly performing stock, an investor does not need to admit 
his/hers lack of ability in decision making (Hirsleifer 2001: 11). Another explanation for 
disposition effect may be conservatism. Conservatism implies that under some 
circumstances, investors do not revise their current beliefs in the way that a rational 
Bayesian would, when faced with relevant new information. According to Hirsleifer 
(2001) one explanation for conservatism is that processing new information and 
revising current beliefs is cognitively too costly. People tend to underweight 
information that is represented in a statistical or abstract form, and overweight 
information, in which causal relationships are easily observable and the information is 
simple to process. Confirmatory bias is closely related to conservatism. People have a 
tendency to interpret unclear information in a way that is consistent with their prior 
beliefs. Contradicting new information is examined with caution and possibly explained 
as a chance result or faulty data gathering. (2001: 14.) 
 
On the other hand, the biases of representativeness and salience imply that people 
extrapolate too powerfully from patterns in small samples, and overreact to some type 
of information. For example, under uncertainty, investors tend to believe that an 
excellent past performance on a given firm is “representative” of the firm’s future 
performance or that a poorly performing company will continue to perform poorly. 
(Boussaidi 2013: 10). Thus, representativeness heuristics can result in trend chasing, as 
people believe that trends have systematic causes. Clustering illusion appears, when 
people interpret random clusters as causal patterns and fail to recognize that the 
occurrences are serially independent. (Hirsleifer 2001: 14.)  
 
As different psychological biases tend to presume different kind of reactions to new 
market information, the possible effects of the biases should be observed in the setting 
that they occur in. For example, self-deception may be at its strongest in a stable 
environment, when an investor has absorbed a perception and is unwilling to admit that 
he or she has made an erroneous decision. In contrast, in a volatile environment, it 
might be easier for the investor to admit that different opinions are needed. (Hirsleifer 
2001: 14).  
 
 18   
 
2.2.2. Limits of Arbitrage 
 
Efficient market theory asserts that though some investors may be irrational and 
misevaluate stocks, rational well-informed investors will quickly recognize these 
mispricings as excess profit opportunities and drive the prices back to their intrinsic 
values. Thus, arbitrage plays an important role in ensuring market efficiency and 
keeping prices on their fundamental levels. The simple text-book definition of arbitrage 
asserts that arbitrage is a risk-free opportunity to simultaneously purchase and sell the 
same security in two different markets with a different price, and earn a certain gain. 
However, in reality arbitrage almost always contains a risk. (Shleifer & Vishny 1997: 
35). Additionally, whether arbitrage is riskless or risk-free, it requires capital. The larger 
the observed mispricing, the more capital is needed to correct it. Although the efficient 
market theory assumes that arbitrage is conducted by all rational market participants, in 
reality, only relatively few professionals have the information and ability to engage in 
arbitrage with large positions. Most typically arbitrage is conducted by market 
professionals who manage other people’s money. According to Shleifer & Vishny 
(1997) arbitrage is especially ineffective in situations where prices are far from their 
intrinsic values and arbitrageurs are fully invested. When prices further deviate from 
their fundamental values, people who have provided capital for the arbitrage, observe 
that the arbitrageur is losing money and will want to bail out. Thus, arbitrageurs may 
avoid especially volatile arbitrage positions, even if such positions may offer substantial 
returns. The risk of losses and urge to liquidate the portfolio under the pressure from 
fund holders prevents arbitrageurs from driving prices to their fundamental levels. 
(Shleifer & Vishny 1997: 54.) 
 
Another important factor limiting arbitrage is short-sale constrains. According to Miller 
(1977), when investors differ in their opinions about a value of a risky security, short-
sale constrains will cause the price of a security to disproportionately reflect positive 
information. Hence, as a result of impediments to short-selling, the opinions of bearish 
investors are not revealed in prices. Short-sale constrains have been found to lead to 
artificially inflated prices, which are indicated by excessive returns. Stocks that are 
subject to higher short-sale impediments tend to have lower price efficiency (Saffi & 
Sigurdsson 2011: 821).  
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2.3. Noise trading  
There exists substantial evidence that many investors do not follow advice of 
economists to buy and hold the market portfolio. Instead, individual investors fail to 
diversify their portfolios by holding just a single stock or a small number of stocks. 
These investors choose their stocks according to their own research rather than the 
recommendations of professionals (DeLong, Sheifler, Summers Waldmann 1990: 704). 
Black (1986) defines such investors as “noise traders”. Typically, noise traders are 
investors with no access to inside information, who irrationally act on noise as if it was 
information that would give them advantage in the markets. According to Black (1986) 
noise-trading accounts for a significant proportion of overall trading in securities 
markets and is essential to the existence of liquid markets. On the other hand, noise 
trading also generates noise into the prices. Thus, stock prices are formed on the basis of 
information that rational information traders trade on and noise that noise trader trade 
on. In other words, a price of a security is always a noisy estimate of its value. (1986: 
531)  
 
Black (1986) states that an increase in noise trading makes trading on information more 
profitable. However, the profit is not guaranteed due to the risk of trading against noise. 
As the noise in prices increase, information traders take larger positions in order to 
eliminate the noise. The larger the positions are, the larger the risk becomes, and there 
will be a limit to how large a position an information trader is willing to take (1986: 
531). Similarly, Delong et al. (1990) find that arbitrageurs tend to be risk averse and 
have moderately short horizons. Thus, they have limitations in taking positions against 
noise traders (1990: 705). The noise that noise traders generate into prices cumulates 
over time and stock prices deviate further from their fundamental values (Black 1986: 
532). It might take a long time for noise traders to lose their money and during this 
time, arbitrageurs have to bear fundamental risk while holding the opposite position. 
The risk might even become more extreme before the noise traders’ beliefs revert, and if 
the arbitrageurs have to liquidate before the reversion, they suffer losses. The same 
logic applies to short positions of arbitrageurs. If noise traders’ bullishness increases 
after arbitrageurs have taken short positions, arbitrageurs have to account for the risk 
that they have to buy the stock back with a higher price. In sum, arbitrageurs cannot 
eliminate the mispricing caused by noise traders because noise itself creates a risk. 
Hence, prices can deviate significantly form fundamental values even though no 
fundamental risk exists (Daniel et al. 1990: 705-706). Eventually information traders are 
able to drive the price back to its intrinsic value, but the move is often so gradual that it 
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is hard to observe. Brasky and De Long (1993) propose a model that accounts for the 
role of noise traders in the markets:  
 
(1) pt =   dt/(r − gt  ), 
 
Where 𝑔𝑡 is the permanent growth rate in dividends from date t. This permanent growth 
rate is the expected average dividend growth rate following date t. Despite the fact that 
𝑔𝑡 is assumed to be constant as of date t, the dividend is not fixed. Hence, each day 
investors revise their estimates of the dividend growth based on new information that 
arrives to the markets. According to Barsky & De Long (1993), dividend (𝑑𝑡) and 
dividend growth rate (𝑔𝑡) are positively correlated, meaning that when dividend 
changes, investors generalize this change into the future, causing a positive change in 
dividend growth rate as well. Hence, the positive change in 𝑑𝑡 affects the price not only 
through the numerator but also indirectly through the growth rate. As 𝑔𝑡 is positively 
affected by 𝑑𝑡, the stock price will grow more proportionately. This model explains why 
stock prices may overreact to new positive information. (1993: 203). 
 
Daniel et al. (1998) propose a model that accounts for investor confidence and its 
impact on possible over- and underreactions to public and private information. In their 
model, overconfidence in the private information results in an initial overreaction in a 
stock price. Later on, when noisy public information arrives, part of the overreaction in 
the price is corrected. The overreaction in the stock price gets fully corrected after 
further public information arrives to the market. The overreaction phase is the impulse 
response prior to the price peak or through which is followed by a correction phase 
(1998: 1847). Indeed, many papers (Jegadees & Titman 2009, Moskowitz & Grinblatt 
1999, Cooper et. al 2004) show a short-run continuation in stock prices, which violates 
the theory of efficient markets. These findings are in support of overreaction of market 
participants.  
 
Barberis et al. (1998) propose an alternative model for overreaction in stock prices. In 
their model the stock market follows a random walk but an investor is under the 
clustering illusion, and does not recognize the serial independence of prices. In contrast, 
the investor falls to the fallacy of representativeness and believes that series of good 
news are a sign of consistent good performance in the future as well. This bias causes an 
overreaction described by 
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(2) 𝐸(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑧𝑡 = 𝐺,𝑧−1 = , … , 𝑧𝑡−𝑗 = 𝐺)         
< 𝐸(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑧𝑡 = 𝐵,𝑧−1 = , … , 𝑧𝑡−𝑗 = 𝐵), 
Where j is at least one and probably higher, 𝑧𝑡 = 𝐺 or 𝑧𝑡 = 𝐵 denotes either good news 
(G) or bad news (B) at period t, and 𝐸(𝑟𝑡+1) is the expected stock return in the period 
following an announcement. The model implies that series of good news will cause the 
investor to become overly optimistic, which in turn drives the stock price to unduly high 
levels. Later on, when new information contradicts investors’ optimism, subsequent 
returns are lower (Barberis et al. 1998: 313).  
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3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
As early as in 1936, John Maynard Keynes stated that the market is “subject to waves of 
optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are unreasoning and yet in a sense 
legitimate where no solid basis exists for a sound calculation.” (1936:154). According 
to Keynes, although people try to make rational decisions between the alternatives 
available, and calculate where they can, they often fall back to their motive on caprice, 
sentiment, or chance (1936: 154). The rational asset pricing models have not left much 
role for the impact of investor sentiment in the valuation of assets. Miller (1977) 
provides an alternative view for the neo-classical decision making theory and argues 
that it is hardly rational to assume that all investors would have the exact same 
predictions about the future, while it is so hard to forecast; The price of a security 
should be higher, the greater the difference of opinion about the return from the 
security. According to Miller (1977), difference of opinion increases with risk, which 
may result in lower expected return for risky securities rather than high. (1977: 1154-
1155.)  
 
Behavioral finance suggests that sentiment of investors is an important factor in the 
formation of asset prices. Investor sentiment can be defined in various ways. DeLong et 
al. (1990) see it as a formation of beliefs about future cash flows and investment risks 
that are not justified by the facts at hand. Baker and Wurgler (2006), on the other hand, 
see investor sentiment as a propensity to speculate. According to Brown and Cliff 
(2002) “sentiment intuitively represents the expectations of market participants relative 
to a norm: a bullish (bearish) investor expects returns to be above (below) average, 
whatever average may be“ (2002: 2). DeBondt and Thaler (1985) suggest that investors 
are subjects to waves of optimism and pessimism. These waves cause prices to deviate 
temporarily from their fundamental values and to exhibit mean reversion later on. 
 
Indeed, recent market history has experienced episodes where market prices could not 
have been set by rational investors, and where psychological factors have played an 
important role. In October 1987 the Dow Jones industrial Average (DIJA) lost 
approximately one-third of its value without any substantial change in the overall 
economic environment. Another example of an extreme episode in the financial markets 
is the ‘Internet bubble’ in the late 1990s, when the valuations for Internet and related 
high-tech companies were highly over their fundamentals. (Malkiel 2003: 73.) 
Individual investors thought that stock market was in a bubble in the late 1990s and 
early 2000. The deflating market of 2000 and 2001 affected negatively to investor 
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expectations but did not deflate the optimism of investors about their own luck and 
abilities. Investors tend to form their expectations as if inflated bubbles continued to 
inflate and deflated bubbles continued to deflate. As the stock market is overvalued, 
investors expect high returns, while during undervaluation of the markets, investors 
expect low returns. (Fisher & Statman 2002: 17.)  
 
3.1. Measures of investor sentiment 
Investors are not alike and neither are their sentiments. (Fisher and Statman 2000:16). 
Many papers (Brown & Cliff 2004, Verma & Verma 2007, Kholdy & Sohrabia 2014) 
suggest that the sentiment of different groups of investors differ from each other. As 
there is no precise valuation model for sentiment, it is difficult to study the effects of 
sentiment empirically. On the grounds of previous literature, measures of sentiment can 
be broadly divided into two groups: direct and indirect measures. Direct measures are 
obtained using surveys and questionnaires given directly to investors, whereas indirect 
measures, are financial variables that capture the effects of sentiment to some extent. 
Commonly used indirect measures are for example closed-end fund discount (CEFD), 
put-call ratio, Initial public offerings (IPOs), advancing issues to declining issues, and 
market liquidity. Survey measures of sentiment have been found to be significantly 
related to indirect sentiment proxies. (Brown & Cliff 2004: 14). 
 
3.1.1. Direct measures of sentiment 
 
Direct measures of sentiment are obtained through surveys and questionnaires, in which 
investors are asked about their market views. Commonly used survey measures of 
investor sentiment are the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) and 
Investor’s Intelligence (II). In the survey conducted by American Association of 
Individual Investors (AAII), respondents are asked about their market views for the 
following 6 months: up, down, or the same.  The respondents are random members of 
AAII, and thus the survey interprets the sentiment of individual investors. Investors 
Intelligence survey on the other hand can be seen as a sentiment proxy for institutional 
investors, as it is conducted from market newsletters, mostly written by market 
professionals.  For both of the surveys, the responses are categorized as bullish, bearish 
or neutral. (Brown & Cliff 2004: 6-7).  
 
Brown and Cliff (2004) study the relationship between the individual sentiment 
measure of AAII and institutional sentiment measure of II, and find that institutional 
 24   
 
sentiment is a significant predictor of individual sentiment but not vice versa. (2004: 19-
22). Verma & Verma (2007) confirm this finding. Kholdy & Sohrabian (2014) show 
contradicting results and state that individual sentiment (AAII) has a statistically 
significant and large impact on institutional sentiment (II). However, they state that past 
stock returns have affected individual sentiment greater than institutional sentiment.  
 
Fisher and Statman (2000) study the relationship between AAII, II, and the sentiment of 
Wall Street strategists, who are considered as the most professional large investors. 
They suggest that sentiment of large investors can be measured by the mean of asset 
allocation to stocks of Wall Street strategists (2000: 16). They report a strong and 
statistically significant relationship between the sentiments of individual investors 
(AAII) and newsletter writers (II). However, the sentiment of Wall Street strategists 
does not seem to have a strong relation to the two other groups. They find a negative 
and statistically significant relationship between the sentiment of small investors and 
S&P 500 returns in the following month. Also, Wall Street strategists’ sentiment is 
found to be negatively related to near future S&P 500 returns. However, the sentiment 
of newsletter writers does not seem to be correlated with subsequent stock returns. 
(2000: 18-17).  
 
In addition to investor sentiment indices such as AAII or II, which are based on surveys 
targeted directly to investors, a number of consumer confidence indices have been used 
as direct measures of investor sentiment. There is a popular belief that the way people 
behave as consumers, is linked to the way they behave as investors (Nofsinger 2005: 
152). Consumer confidence is measured through surveys that pole a large number of 
households on their personal financial situation, the present business conditions and job 
availability. Consumer Confidence Index is then constructed based on these survey 
responds. Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006) find that consumer confidence does a good 
job in predicting troughs and peaks in business cycle. Moreover, Fisher and Statman 
(2003) report that both the consumer confidence survey measures of Conference Board 
and University of Michigan capture elements of investor optimism. According to them, 
consumers perceive the economy and stock markets as “two sides of a coin”. When 
consumers have confidence in the economy, they have confidence in the stock market 
as well, and become bullish (2003: 6). Schmeling (2009) confirms the findings of 
Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) at an international level, and reports that investor 
sentiment, measured by consumer confidence, has a significantly negative effect on 
future stock returns of the 18 different sample countries.  
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Fisher and Statman (2003) find a positive and statistically significant relation between 
the measure of individual investor sentiment (AAII) and the measure of overall 
consumer confidence (CCI). In addition, they find that the AAII measure of investor 
sentiment is positively correlated with the consumers’ future prospects about the 
economy. Consumer confidence measures of Conference Board and the University of 
Michigan both incorporate two components: A present and an expectations component. 
Present component is estimated based on the responds about the current state of the 
economy, while expectations component describes the respondents’ future prospects 
about the economy. (2002: 4). Fisher & Statman (2003) report a statistically significant 
positive correlation between the changes in the expectations component and the present 
component in both confidence measures. According to Fisher and Statman, it seems like 
when consumers lose their faith in the present, they lose their faith in the future as well 
(2003: 5.)  
 
3.1.2. Indirect measures of sentiment 
 
Several different financial variables have been found to reflect investor sentiment. Prior 
studies suggest that investor sentiment is inversely related to closed-end fund discount 
(CEFD), which is the average difference between the net asset values (NAV) of closed-
end stock fund shares and their market prices. Hence, high optimism of investors 
decreases the discount. Qiu & Welch (2006) examine the closed-end fund discount as a 
potential measure of investor sentiment and find that CEFD does not seem to do well in 
capturing the effects of sentiment. CEFD neither correlates with direct sentiment 
measures nor with the excess rate of return on small firms in their sample. According to 
their results, CEFD has only been able to explain small stock excess returns in Januaries 
prior to 1985, but not afterwards. (Qiu & Welch 2006: 3.) 
 
Turnover, or more generally liquidity, is also seen as a proxy for sentiment. Short-sales 
constraints affect the markets so that irrational investors trade and add liquidity only 
when they are optimistic– thus, liquidity is seen as a symptom of overvaluation. Brown 
and Cliff (2004) suggest that variables based on market performance may capture the 
effects of sentiment. They use the number of advancing issues to declining issues as an 
indirect proxy for sentiment. Additionally, they apply the number of new highs to new 
lows (HI/LO), which captures the relative strength of the market as proxy for sentiment. 
Both of the proxies are found to be correlated with direct survey measures of sentiment 
(Brown & Cliff 2004: 11-15). Investor enthusiasm can also be seen in the IPO market. 
Exceptionally high first-day returns of IPOs as well as the number of IPOs in a year 
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reflect investor optimism (Baker & Wurgler 2006: 1656). Baker & Wurgler (2006) 
combine several above-mentioned indirect measures of sentiment into a composite 
sentiment index using principal component analysis and find that their sentiment index 
lines up well with important episodes of market booms and crashes. (Baker & Wurgler 
2006: 1656) 
 
3.1.3. Rational and irrational sentiment components 
 
Previous studies suggest that investor sentiment is formed on the basis of rational 
fundamental components as well as irrational noise components. (Lemmon & 
Portinaguina 2006). Doms & Morin (2004) suggest that consumer confidence contains 
an irrational component as it responds to the volume of economic news reports rather 
than to the contents of the news. The conventional wisdom says that individual 
investors are most likely to be affected by sentiment and institutional investors are seen 
more as the rational agents with more unbiased estimations of stocks’ intrinsic values. 
(Brown and Cliff 2004: 1.) Brown and Cliff (2004) suggest that the price effects on 
large stocks are due to institutional investor sentiment while small stocks are affected by 
retail investor sentiment. However, they find that sentiment is not limited to individual 
investors. In fact, the strongest relations seem to exist between measures of institutional 
investor sentiment and returns on large stocks.  According to Brown and Cliff (2004), it 
might be that only institutional sentiment is powerful enough to affect asset prices. 
(2004: 19-22). Kholdy & Sohrabia (2014) regress survey measures of individual and 
institutional sentiment on several macroeconomic variables and find that institutional 
sentiment is formed mostly on the basis of rational fundamentals (64%). In contrast, the 
economic fundamentals explain only 39% of individual sentiment, pointing out that 
exuberance has greater impact in forming individual sentiment. (Kholdy & Sohrabian 
2014: 854). 
 
Verma & Verma (2007) study the effects of fundamental and noise trading on the 
conditional volatility of stock returns. Similarly to Lemmon & Portiaguina (2006) they 
separate the fundamental and irrational components of sentiment. Measuring sentiment 
by survey measures of AAII (individual sentiment) and II (institutional sentiment) they 
find that both institutional and individual sentiments are driven by irrational as well as 
by rational factors. Although both sentiments incorporate irrational parts, the effect of 
stock market in formation of sentiment is significant only for individual investors. This 
finding suggests that individual investors are more likely to be positive feedback 
traders, meaning that they buy rising stocks and sell losing stocks.   
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The individual sentiment is significantly related to the following factors: business 
conditions, market excess returns, dividend yield, SMB and HML. Similarly, 
institutional sentiment is related to dividend yield, SMB and HML. Verma & Verma 
(2007) find that rational sentiments have more positive effects on stock returns, while 
irrational sentiments are negatively related to stock returns. In line with behavioral 
theories, irrational sentiments have asymmetric effects on stock returns. The impact on 
irrational sentiment is greater when investors are bullish compared to bearish, a finding 
in line with Brown and Cliff (2005). The rational parts of sentiment do not exhibit any 
asymmetric effects. (2007: 242.) 
 
Verma, Baklaci and Soydemir (2008) examine the relative impacts of irrational and 
rational investor sentiment on Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P500 returns. They 
find that economic fundamentals, as determinants of stock returns, play an important 
role in sentiment. The effect of rational sentiment on stock market returns is greater 
compared to the effect of irrational sentiment. The irrational part of institutional 
investor sentiment has an immediate positive effect on the returns followed by a 
negative reversal. Thus, it seems that the excessive optimism drives prices above 
fundamental values and prices revert back to their intrinsic values shortly after. In 
contrast to Verma & Verma (2007), past stock returns are found to have an impact on 
both individual and institutional irrational sentiments. Moreover, it takes longer for 
rational effects of sentiment to get incorporated in stock prices compared to irrational 
effects, which implicates the longer time consumed to analyze information based on 
economic fundamentals.  
 
3.2. Investor sentiment and stock characteristics  
According to Miller (1977), market prices do not reflect the expectations of average 
investors, but of the minority who buy the particular security (1977: 1157).  A small 
group of largely optimistic investors can drive the price of given security up when 
rational investors are unwilling to sell short (1977: 1154).  Baker & Wurgler (2006) 
assert that short-selling is especially risky for small and new companies, whose future 
prospects are uncertain. Hence, prices of these types of stocks tend to be more prone to 
shifts in sentiment, relative to companies with a longer earnings history (Baker & 
Wurgler 2006: 1646).  
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 In addition to the short-selling argument of Baker and Wurgler (2006), small 
companies may be more affected by sentiment due to the fact that noise traders are 
likely to be individual investors and small stocks are disproportionately held by 
individuals as opposed to institutions (Lee, Shleifer & Thaler 1991). Nagel (2005) finds 
a strong positive correlation between firm size and ownership by institutions. Chen 
(2011) tests whether the level of institutional ownership in firm affects the impact of 
pessimism and shows that consumer confidence does not have a significant effect on the 
returns of those stocks that are in the highest institutional ownership decile.  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) suggest that investor sentiment should have a significant 
effect on the cross-section of stock returns due to uninformed demand shocks that cause 
mispricing in the markets. They test if cross-section of subsequent stock returns varies 
with beginning-of-period sentiment. Investor sentiment is measured by a composite 
index that captures the common component in six indirect proxies of sentiment. 
Moreover, these components are regressed on several macroeconomic variables in order 
obtain a cleaner measure of sentiment and to remove business cycle variation from the 
proxies.  Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that sentiment has significant cross-sectional 
effects on stock returns in their sample period from 1963 to 2001: When the beginning 
of period sentiment is estimated to be high (above average) stocks that are young, small, 
unprofitable, non-dividend paying, highly volatile, extreme growth, and distressed earn 
relatively low subsequent returns. During low sentiment periods (sentiment index is 
below sample average), small stock earn exceptionally high subsequent average returns. 
The results are especially striking when the stocks are sorted based on the age of the 
firm: When sentiment is positive, investors tend to demand young stocks while during 
negative sentiment, older stocks become more appealing. During pessimistic periods, 
youngest stocks earn 0,54% per month less than the oldest stocks. In contrast, during 
optimistic periods the average monthly returns of youngest stocks are 0,85% higher than 
the returns to oldest stocks. Baker and Wurgler (2006) conclude that market-wide 
sentiment is associated with cross-sectional return differences, and that stocks that are 
hard to arbitrage and value are especially exposed to sentiment. According to Baker and 
Wurgler (2006), the results cannot purely stem from compensation for systematic risk 
and rational financial models alone are not able to explain the findings. (2006: 164-
1647.) 
 
Kholdy & Sohrabian (2014) study the dynamic interaction between individual investor 
sentiment and institutional investor sentiment on US stock returns using AAII and II 
measures of sentiment (2014: 849-850.). As Baker and Wurgler (2006), they focus on 
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the returns of small, volatile, distressed, non-dividend paying, unprofitable and extreme 
growth securities that have proven to be especially vulnerable to sentiment. Their data 
spans from January 1990 to December 2010 covering a long bullish period in the 1990s 
and boom in the turn of the millennium.  Kholdy & Sohrabian (2014) find support for 
the evidence that high irrational sentiment period combined with significant risk of 
arbitrage results in relatively low subsequent returns on speculative stocks. Their results 
show that in the period from 2000 to 2010, when the markets were more volatile and 
short-selling was less risky, sentiment did not have an impact on the returns in their 
sample. (Kholdy & Sohrabia 2014: 856-859.)  
 
Brown and Cliff (2004) study the impacts of sentiment on U.S. stock returns during 
1965-1998 using several indirect and direct (AAII & II) proxies of sentiment. Although, 
a strong co-movement between all sentiment measures and stock market returns is 
found, their results show very little evidence that sentiment is capable of predicting 
subsequent stock returns on a short horizon (2004: 17-18). When they test the 
predictability on a weekly data, they find no statistically significant results. Albeit 
sentiment does not seem to have predictive power on stock returns on a short-horizon, it 
does not imply that sentiment would have no effect on prices at all. It is possible that 
sentiment drives prices away from their fundamental values for extended periods of 
time, in which case the effect of sentiment is difficult to observe. Brown and Cliff 
(2005) test this issue by studying the impact of sentiment on longer horizons and find 
that high levels of sentiment, result in significantly lower returns over the next 2-3 
years. The high optimism has an impact on the aggregate market, but the impact is 
especially strong in large growth stocks. One standard deviation (bullish) shock to 
sentiment forecasted 7 % underperformance of the market over the next three years. 
(Brown & Cliff 2005: 407-408.)  
 
Fisher and Statman (2000) compare sentiment effects of different groups of investors 
(individual, medium and large), using three different sentiment survey measures, each 
to represent the sentiment of one group. They find that the sentiment level of individual 
investors is a reliable contrary indicator for future S&P 500 returns. As opposed to 
Brown and Cliff (2006), they find no support for the hypothesis that individual investor 
sentiment affects primarily small stocks (CRPS 9-10 index) whereas institutional 
sentiment mostly affects the returns of large stocks. In contrast, the sentiment of 
individual investors seems to have a stronger impact on the returns of large stocks 
compared to small stocks. Moreover, the sentiment of large investors shows a stronger 
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correlation with the returns of small stocks compared to the returns of large stocks. 
(2000: 19).   
 
Fisher and Statman (2003) study the impact of sentiment, measured by various 
consumer confidence indices on U.S stock returns during 1987 and 1998. The 
relationship between contemporaneous changes in consumer confidence indices and 
stock returns is positive and highly significant. Thus, confidence moves with stock 
returns. This finding could be explained by the fact stock returns bring wealth, which in 
turn boosts confidence. Additionally, Fisher and Statman (2003) test the predictive 
power of various consumer confidence measures on U.S stock returns. They report 
similar results to Baker and Wurgler (2006):  When sentiment is low in the previous 
month, stock returns in the following month tend to be positive. The predictive power 
persists at one-month, 6-month and 12-month horizon. Moreover, the negative 
relationship is especially pronounced for Nasdaq-US stock returns and for returns of 
small stocks. However, consumer confidence is not a reliable predictor for S&P500 
returns, as the index consists of large cap stocks. Schmeling (2009) shows similar 
results to those on Fisher and Statman (2003) on an international level. He finds that 
sentiment, measured by CCI, has a significant effect on returns of small stocks but not 
for large stocks. Moreover, the impact of sentiment is stronger for value stocks 
compared to growth stocks. As consumer confidence index rises one standard deviation, 
aggregate value stock returns decrease by 0,5%, whereas growth stock returns 
experience a 0,3% decline. This finding is contradicting to that of Brown and Cliff 
(2005), who find a larger impact of sentiment on growth stocks. Baker and Wurgler 
(2006), on the other hand, find no disparity between the impact of sentiment on value 
and growth stocks.  
 
Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006) study the time-series relationship between investor 
sentiment and stock returns using the survey measure of consumer confidence 
conducted by the Conference Board (CBIND) and confidence measure conducted by 
University of Michigan Survey Research Center as proxies for investor sentiment. As in 
Baker and Wurgler (2006), the two confidence measures are regressed on a set of 
macroeconomic variables in order to distinguish the irrational element of sentiment 
from the fundamental part. The residual from the regression is then used as a measure of 
superfluous optimism or pessimism, which is not based on rational factors. Lemmon & 
Portinaguina (2006) evaluate the extent to which investor sentiment affects prices of 
different stocks during times of optimistic and pessimistic appraisals of market 
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conditions by investors during 1956-2002. Specifically, they focus on the differences 
between the returns of small and large firms (size premium).  
 
The results show that the magnitude of the sentiment effect is different between the two 
sub periods.  During 1956-1977 consumer confidence exhibits no forecasting power on 
size premium. However, in the latter sub-period, covering 1977–2002, a strong and 
statistically significant negative relationship between the confidence measures and size 
premium is found. As confidence measure increases by one standard deviation, the 
corresponding size premium decreases from 3 % to 5 % over the following quarter. The 
results are similar for the 6- and 12-month holding periods. (2006: 1513-1514.) While 
many studies on investor sentiment focus on the direct impact on investor sentiment on 
stock returns, Yu and Yuan (2011) suggest a mechanism in which sentiment affects the 
compensation for volatility first and then, in turn, price levels. They argue that high 
market sentiment reduces risk premiums by activating irrational sentiment traders who 
demand lower price of risk. Yu & Yuan (2011) find that the mean-variance tradeoff is 
strongly affected by investor sentiment. Their results show that stock market’s expected 
excess return is positively related to the market’s conditional variance in low-sentiment 
periods but unrelated to variance during high sentiment. The results show that the 
sentiment effect on the mean-variance trade-off is stronger for equally-weighted index 
than for value-weighted index. Hence, although sentiment affects also large-cap stocks, 
the effect is stronger in small stocks.  During high sentiment periods the otherwise 
positive tradeoff is undermined. In addition, during high-sentiment periods, realized 
variances are much higher compared to their counterparts in low-sentiment periods. The 
results suggest that stock prices are more volatile in high-sentiment periods compared to 
low sentiment periods. Their findings are consistent with the large influence of noise 
traders during high sentiment. (2011: 367, 372-373.) 
 
Strambaugh et al. (2012) study the impact investor sentiment on a variety of market 
anomalies in cross-sectional stock returns. As in Yu and Yuan (2011), they assume 
markets to be less rational during high-sentiment periods. In accordance with the lower 
rationality during high sentiment, anomalies, which stem from overpricing, should be 
more prevalent during these periods. In contrast to Baker and Wurgler (2006), who 
suggest that difficulty to value and arbitrage certain types of stocks is the main reason 
for mispricing, Stambaugh et al. (2012) see short selling constraints as the main 
obstacle in eliminating mispricing. Hence, due to short sale impediments they assume 
stocks included in the short leg to be more overpriced during high sentiment and returns 
on the short leg to be lower (higher profits) following high sentiment period. 
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Additionally, the returns on the long leg of the portfolio should not be very exposed to 
sentiment since underpricing is less prevalent in the markets than overpricing. (2012: p. 
289).  
 
As Baker and Wurgler (2006), Stambaugh et al. (2012) construct a composite sentiment 
index based on several indirect sentiment proxies. They construct eleven long-short 
strategies based on well-known asset pricing anomalies and find that the strategies 
produce significantly positive average return spreads, varying from 0,43% to 1,77 %( 
2012:  293). They classify each month on the sample period as “high sentiment” or “low 
sentiment” based on the value of the sentiment index on the previous month. When the 
sentiment index exceeds (falls below) its median value on the previous month, 
sentiment is defined as high (low). The average returns are then calculated separately 
for each high- and low-sentiment month.  
 
The long-short strategies are found to be more profitable following periods of high 
sentiment. The return spread of the combined long-short strategy is 0,93 % higher 
following high sentiment, and the result is statistically highly significant. Moreover, the 
short legs of the portfolios are more profitable following times of high sentiment; all the 
short legs of the strategies have lower average returns following a high-sentiment 
month. The short side of the combined strategy has 1,32 % lower monthly returns 
following high sentiment, in contrast to following low sentiment. This finding indicates 
that short sale constrains, combined with market-wide sentiment, have a significant 
impact on mispricing. In addition, the long legs of the strategies do not seem to be 
exposed to changes in sentiment, which refers to underpricing being less prevalent in 
the markets. (Strambaugh et al. 2012: 294). 
 
Baker et al. (2012) study sentiment and cross-sections of stock returns. Stocks 
considered relatively volatile, small, non-dividend paying, distressed, or extreme growth 
are classified as high sentiment beta stocks, and they are expected to be more 
pronounced to sentiment. They form portfolios based on four measures; firm size, book-
to-market equity ratio and sales growth, which are ought to capture the sentiment beta 
level of the stock. The stocks are sorted across years based on the level of their total 
sentiment index (negative or positive) (2012: 283-284). The results indicate that the 
highest volatility stocks earn 1,34 % less per month when the year begins with a high-
sentiment state. This finding supports the correction of sentiment-driven overpricing 
theory. The top decile of sales growth portfolio has 1.07% lower returns when exiting 
high-sentiment periods. Also for the bottom decile market equity- portfolio, the 
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difference between the returns in high- and low-sentiment states is 1% per month. 
(2012: 284.) In line with Baker and Wurgler, (2006) hard to arbitrage and hard to value 
stocks are found to be especially prone to country’s total sentiment. When sentiment is 
high, future returns of high growth, volatile, and distressed stocks are relatively low. 
(2012: 272–273). 
 
3.2.1. Market cycles and investor sentiment 
 
According to behavioral theories investors are most optimistic during times of economic 
expansion. Chung, Hung and Yeh (2012) show that the predictive power of investor 
sentiment on cross-section of stock returns varies across different market cycle states. 
They use the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006) as a proxy for sentiment and 
test the predictive power of investor sentiment on stock returns on a short-term horizon 
(2012: p. 218). The market cycle variations are classified to expansion or contraction 
based on the NBER data and Markov-switching model with time-varying regime 
transition probabilities are used to estimate economic regimes (2012: 220). In their 
sample period between 1966 and 2007 they find a positive correlation (0.11) between 
the NBER recession indicator and the level of investor sentiment. Also the recession 
regime of the two-state Markov-switching model has a positive correlation with investor 
sentiment (0,27). Hence, sentiment index by Baker and Wurgler (2006) seems to have a 
higher average value during recessions compared to expansions. (2012: 223–224). 
 
Chung et al. (2012) construct equally weighted long-short portfolios based on several 
firm characteristics (market equity, BE/ME, dividend yield, E/P, firm age, return 
volatility, expense-to-assets, fixed assets, sales growth and external finance-to-assets) 
that go long in stocks with the high characteristic values and short the stocks with low 
values. The results show that when sentiment is high, stocks that are either small, high 
volatility, young, high growth, low-earnings, or non-dividend paying have lower future 
returns compared to stocks that are large size, old, value, low growth, high dividend 
yields, high earnings, low volatility, and low intangible asset. These results are 
consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Stambaugh et.al (2012). When 
controlling for the economic regime, the predictive power of investor sentiment is 
insignificant during the recession states, whereas during expansions sentiment has a 
strong and statistically significant predictive power. (Chung et al. 2012: 220.) 
In addition, Chung et al. test the predictability on investor sentiment on eleven anomaly-
based portfolios (Failure probability, Ohlson’s O-Score, Net stock issues, composite 
equity issuance, total accruals, net operating assets, momentum, gross profitability, asset 
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growth, returns on assets and investments to assets) by going long on the highest 
performing stocks in each anomaly group and shorting stocks in the lowest performing 
decile. They find positive and significant coefficients for anomalies associated with 
Failure probability, Ohlson’s O-score, net stock issues, composite equity issuance, net 
operating assets, gross profitability, and return on assets (2012: p 238). When 
controlling for the economic regimes, they find that the predictive power of investor 
sentiment on the returns of the anomalies is economic regime-dependent. Overall, the 
predictive power is more pronounced during economic expansion states than in 
recession states. Chung et al. assert that their findings are consistent with theories of 
overreaction: Sentiment increases with the wave of economic expansion and results in 
overpricing that is especially significant on stock that are hard to value and arbitrage 
(2012:  237.) 
 
Chen (2011) investigates if the effect of consumer confidence on stock returns is 
asymmetric between bull and bear market states and if the decreased level of consumer 
confidence leads to bearish market state. The sample covers S&P 500 stock index 
returns during 1978-2009, and consumer confidence is measured using University of 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (UMCSI). (2011: p. 225).  Chen (2011) finds a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between stock returns and lack of 
confidence, which supports the theory that investor pessimism has a lowering effect on 
stock returns. Also, an asymmetric relationship between confidence shocks and stock 
returns is identified. Lack of consumer confidence has a greater impact on stock returns 
during bear markets than during bull markets, as expected. Moreover, the impact of 
market pessimism affects the small stocks greater than large stocks. The negative 
impact of market pessimism on size premium is evident in both, bull and bear market 
states, but the impact is greater during bear markets. (2011: p 231–232). 
 
3.2.2. Investor sentiment globally 
 
Earlier findings suggest that the impact of sentiment on stock returns might be 
correlated with the level of cultural collectivism and institutional quality in a given 
country, as well as with uncertainty avoidance among individuals. Schmeling (2009) 
compares the effects of sentiment between the 18 industrialized sample countries.  
Sentiment-return relation seems to vary quite much between the countries, and there is 
no evidence that the relation would be connected to the size or location of the country. 
The strongest negative relationships between sentiment and subsequent stock returns are 
found in Germany, Italy and Japan, whereas almost no correlation is identified in 
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Australia, New Zealand and U.K. (2000: 400). Schmeling (2009) finds that the impact 
of sentiment on future stock returns is strongest over the forecast horizon of one to six 
months and decreases over longer horizons. The results are in line with theoretical 
considerations of the impact of noise traders: Noise trading effects diminish over longer 
period of time as limits to arbitrage become weaker. Differences between the sentiment-
return relations among the sample countries are examined by dividing the countries into 
subsets according to their exposure to the aforementioned determinants. The results 
show that countries with high level of collectivism and uncertainty avoidance 
experience larger effects of sentiment on returns compared to individualistic and low 
uncertainty avoidance countries. The sentiment-return relation is considerably stronger 
in countries where herding and overreaction is more pronounced. Moreover, a higher 
level of institutional quality weakens the impact of sentiment on stock returns. (2009: 
404-406).  
 
Bathia & Bredin (2013) study the relation between investor sentiment and stock market 
returns on G7 countries, using direct surveys measures as well as several indirect 
financial measures as proxies for sentiment. Using monthly data from 1995 to 2007, 
they find that investor sentiment has a significant negative effect on stock returns and 
the effect of sentiment is stronger for value stocks compared to growth stocks. The 
effect of survey sentiment varies between the sample countries. In USA, only growth 
stocks and aggregate stock market are affected by survey sentiment, while in Canada 
the effect exists for value and growth stocks as well as for the overall market. The 
predictive power of survey sentiment on overall market returns is present also for 
France, Germany and Italy on a one month-forecast horizon. Interestingly, survey 
sentiment has no predictive power for Japan and UK on the same forecast horizon. The 
impact of survey sentiment on returns is found to reduce gradually beyond the one-
month forecast horizon.  According to Bathia and Bredin (2013) these dissimilarities 
between the sample countries may be due to the differences in the survey structures and 
the number of participants. The effect of consumer confidence index is consistently 
observed in all the sample countries in contrast to the indirect measures (CEEF discount 
and equity fund flow).  
 
Also Baker, Wurgler & Yuan (2012) find evidence that investor sentiment affects stock 
returns globally. They study the global and local components of investor sentiment on 
six major stock markets; Canada, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and the 
U.S. They construct a local sentiment index for each sample country, as well as a global 
index that combines all the local indices.  Their results show that global sentiment 
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seems to be a contrarian predictor for country level returns. When global sentiment 
index increases by one standard deviation, the value-weighted market returns in the next 
year are 5,4 % lower, and the equal-weighted market returns 5,6 % lower. In addition, a 
country’s local investor sentiment index seems to be a contrarian predictor of market 
returns, though not as strong as global sentiment. A one standard deviation increase in 
total investor sentiment is associated with 3,5 pp lower value-weighted returns per year 
and 4,3 % lower equal-weighted returns. Baker et al. (2012) conclude that both global 
and local components of sentiment predict the returns of high-sentiment beta portfolios 
that include high volatility stocks, or stocks of distressed small and growth companies. 
Sentiment seems to be contagious across markets and international capital flows is one 
of the mechanisms through which it emerges. (2012: 286.)  
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4. DATA AND METHODS 
 
4.1 Return data 
The sample period covers fourteen years, from January 2001 to December 2014. This 
period is chosen partly because of limitations in the availability of the data. Also, the 
period is interesting in a sense that it covers the crash of the dot.com boom in the 
beginning of 2000 as well as the sub-prime crisis which started in September 2007. The 
return data consists of eight Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indices and 
OMX Helsinki All-Share index. The MSCI indices are: MSCI Finland Small, MSCI 
Finland Large, MSCI Finland Growth, MSCI Finland Value, MSCI Finland Small 
Growth, MSCI Finland Large Growth, MSCI Finland Small Value and MSCI Finland 
Large Value. As a general benchmark index for the Finnish stock market, I use The 
OMX Helsinki All-Share Index, which includes all the shares listed on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange.  
 
The MSCI indices measure the performance of 50 stock markets across the world. The 
indices are calculated daily in US dollars and in local currency. Valuation ratios for the 
indices (P/E, P/CE, P/BV, Return on Equity and dividend yield) are calculated on a 
monthly basis and the market value is calculated each day. Free-float stands for the 
proportion of the shares of a security, which are freely available for trading in the 
market. Free float is an important matter when constructing an investable index. The 
combined market capitalization of firms in MSCI indices represents approximately 85% 
of the free float adjusted market capitalization in each country. MSCI total return 
indices, which are used in this study, measure the price performance of markets with the 
income from constituent dividends.   
 
MSCI Value and Growth indices are a sub-set of the MSCI Standard indices. Till May 
2003 both of the indices were based on price to book value, which was used to divide 
the MSCI standard country indices into value and growth style indices. After May 2003, 
the original methodology was changed to a more complex one. Since June 2003 Value 
and Growth index have been calculated using eight variables. Value index is based on 
book value to price ratio, 12-month forward earnings to price ration and dividend yield. 
Growth index on the other hand is determined by long-term forward earnings per shares 
(EPS) growth rate, short term forward (EPS) growth rate, current internal growth rate, 
long-term historical EPS growth trend and long-term historical sales per share growth 
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trend. MSCI Finland Small index, on the other hand, tracks the performance of small 
cap stocks. The MSCI World Small cap index was launched on Jan 01, 2001, which 
limits the availability of the data.  It includes securities with a market cap between 200-
1500 million US dollars. (Thomson Financial Limited 2005.) 
 
OMX-Helsinki (OMXH) index was established in December 1990 with a base level of 
1000. OMXH is an all-share index that incorporates all the stocks listed on Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. Thus, it aims to reflect the current state and changes in the market. As 
the main purpose of the index is to mirror the population of shares representing the 
index, the index does not comply with liquidity and stability requirements. Hence, the 
index itself may not be easy to replicate in a portfolio against the pricing of the shares. 
One must account for the fact that because of the lack in liquidity requirements, the 
index level may lag due to infrequent trading in the underlying shares. (Nasdaq 2014: 
3). 
 
The maintenance of the OMXH-Index shares is carried out on a daily basis, in order to 
sufficiently reflect the ongoing changes in outstanding shares and listed companies. In 
this study, the total return index is used. The total return index reflects changes in 
market value of Index Shares during the trading day. The index value reflects ordinary 
and extraordinary dividends. The reinvestment of extraordinary dividend is done by 
subtracting the extraordinary dividend from the price on the ex-dividend date. By 
performing this adjustment, the dividend in all index shares is reinvested in proportion 
to their respective gains. The number of shares of a company used in the index, is the 
current outstanding number of shares. In case of such corporate actions that cause 
adjustments in the index, the number of shares is changes so that it fully reflects the the 
new market capitalization of the company in the index.  (Nasdaq 2014: 13-16). 
 
As Table 1 shows, returns on small stocks have had a higher performance compared to 
large and value stocks. The size effect described by Banz (1981) can be seen in the 
Finnish markets. MSCI Small Value index has been superior to all other indices with 
average monthly returns of 1,14%. Also MSCI Small stock index has outperformed 
most of the indices.  MSCI Large Growth returns have the largest standard deviation, 
whereas standard deviation is smallest for the MSCI Small and MSCI Small Value 
index returns.  
 
Skewness measures the asymmetry of the return series around its mean, thus for the 
normal distribution, skewness is zero. Kurtosis on the other hand measures the 
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peakedness or flatness of the distribution of the series. Kurtosis for the normal 
distribution is 3.  The results indicate negative skewness for large growth, small growth, 
small, and large value index returns. Skweness is especially strong for the returns of the 
large growth index, which implicates that the returns have a long left tail. For the large 
value, OMXH, and Small Value and Value index returns skewness is positive, 
indicating a long tail to the right. Moreover, all returns series exhibit excess kurtosis, 
which means that their distribution is more peaked that the Gaussian distribution. The 
Jarque-Bera statistic describes, if the series is normally distributed. For Jargue-Bera test, 
the null is that the series is normally distributed.  Thus, small probability values from 
the Jargue-Bera test lead to rejection of the null. The results indicate that none of the 
return series is normally distributed. To account for this issue, logarithm returns are 
used. All the index returns are logarithmized the following way 
 
(3)  Rlog = ln (Pt/Pt.1) = ln( Pt) − ln (Pt−1), 
 
where 𝑃𝑡  is the price of the index at time t and 𝑃𝑡−1is the price of the index in 
subsequent period.  
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the average monthly returns of each sample index. The returns are 
expressed in percents.  
  Growth 
Large 
Growth 
Large 
Value OMXH 
Small 
Growth Small 
Small 
Value Value Large 
Mean 0,23 -0,04 0,41 0,31 0,33 0,96 1,14 0,41 -0,04 
Median 1,06 1,13 0,93 1,04 1,32 0,96 1,51 0,73 0,62 
Maximum 37,01 32,03 37,27 29,25 19,18 27,88 31,51 33,19 35,32 
Minimum -35,02 -0,44 -21,76 -26,88 -27,16 
-
20,00 -19,08 
-
17,09 -33,01 
Std. Dev. 0,10 0,11 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,10 
Skewness -0,25 -8,55 0,44 0,03 -0,78 -0,17 0,15 0,47 -0,04 
Kurtosis 5,43 5,72 5,12 5,56 4,17 5,28 6,50 5,26 4,88 
          
Jarque-Bera 42,92 69,63 36,83 46,03 26,58 37,09 86,33 41,95 24,81 
Probability 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
          
Sum 0,39 -0,72 0,69 0,51 0,55 1,61 1,92 0,70 -0,07 
Sum Sq.   
Dev. 1,70 1,93 1,10 0,95 0,91 0,66 0,64 0,83 1,63 
          
 
Observations 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
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4.2 Consumer Confidence Index and Economic Sentiment Indicator 
Consumer confidence index (CCI) is constructed based on a qualitative consumer 
survey, which describes the views and intentions of consumers related to economic 
matters. Consumer Confidence survey was first introduced in November 1987, when the 
data was collected twice per year. Since 1995 the data has been collected monthly in 
accordance with the harmonized EU data collection method.  The Consumer Survey is a 
telephone interview, in which the respondents are asked about the development of their 
own and Finland’s economic situation. The survey consists of 17 EU harmonized 
questions in addition to Statistics Finland’s own questions, which are made monthly or 
quarterly. The questions include backward looking questions as well as questions about 
the future prospects about economy related matters (see Appendix 2.) 
 
In most of the questions, respondents can choose their answer among five options: 
“got/get a lot better”(++), “got/get a little bit better”(+). “stayed/stay the same” (=), 
“got/get a little worse” (-), “got/get” a lot worse (--), or “cannot say” (N) (European 
Commission 2016). The characteristic value index is then derived from the percentage 
distribution of the responses. The figure describes the average opinion of the 
respondents at any given time. The arithmetic mean of the four most central balance 
figures (EU Harmonized questions 2,4,9 and 13) is called the Consumer Confidence 
indicator. The questions are: 
 
1. What will your own economic situation be like in 12 months' time compared to 
present? 
2. What will Finland's economic situation be like in 12 months' time compared to 
present? 
3. What will be the number of the unemployed in Finland in 12 months' time compared                             
     to present? 
4. How likely are you to be able to save money within the next 12 months?  
 
The survey also aims to depict the household’s intention of making purchases, saving 
and raising loans. Survey data consists of a random sample of 2350 individuals that 
changes completely every month. The target area is the whole country, thus, the sample 
represents all Finnish households. The interviewees are private persons permanently 
living in Finland and aged 15 to 84. The surveys are carried out during the first two or 
three weeks of the month and the results are published in Finland on the 27th day of the 
survey month. The response data of the Consumer Survey are expanded to the whole 
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population with weighting coefficients, which correct the impact of non-response and 
enhances the statistical accuracy of the data. A number of studies have shown that 
consumer data can predict the economic behavior of consumers rather accurately. The 
results of the survey are strongly correlated with inflation, unemployment, private 
consumptions and GDP. (Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) Updated 02.06.2015) 
 
Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) is composite indicator that consists of five sectoral 
confidence indicators with different weights: Industrial confidence indicator, Services 
confidence indicator, Consumer confidence indicator, Construction confidence indicator 
and Retail trade confidence indicator. The surveys are conducted on a monthly basis. 
The industry monthly questions regard production, employment expectations, order-
book levels, stock of finished products and selling price. Construction indicator is based 
on questions regarding trend of activity, order-books, employment expectations, price 
expectations, and factors that limit building activity. Retail sales monthly questions 
concern business situation, stocks of goods, order’s placed with suppliers and firm’s 
employment. Services monthly questions regard business climate, evolution of demand, 
evolution of employment and selling prices whereas financial services monthly 
questions concern business situation, evolution of demand as well as employment. 
(European Commission 2016.) 
 
Approximately 135 000 firms and more 40 000 individuals are interviewed every month 
across the EU.  For Finland the monthly sample size regarding the industry confidence 
measure is 700 firms. Service confidence measure is based on the answers of 800 firms, 
Retail Trade surveys cover the responses of 500 firms and Construction confidence 
measure is based on the answers of 160 firms.  Confidence indicators are arithmetic 
means of seasonally adjusted balances of responses to a number of questions. The 
balances are calculated as the difference between positive and negative answers. The 
results of the surveys are published monthly on the second-last working day. The 
questions of the monthly surveys are in Appendix 1.  Majority of the questions are 
asked on a monthly basis but additional questions are added to the surveys regarding 
industry, construction and among consumers. (European Commission 2016.) 
 
Almost all of the questions are qualitative nature and the respondents are asked to 
choose from three optional answers: “increase” (+), “remain unchanged” (=), 
“decrease” (-); or 
“more than sufficient (+)”, “sufficient” (=), “not sufficient” (-); or “too large(+)”, 
“adequate” (=), “too small” (-). In some questions the respondents may choose from 
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broader set of options; “got/get a lot better”(++), “got/get a little bit better”(+). 
“stayed/stay the same” (=), “got/get a little worse” (-), “got/get” a lot worse (--), or 
“cannot say” (N). (European Commission 2016.) 
 
4.2.1 Controlling for macroeconomic factors 
 
Prior research shows that sentiment proxies are highly correlated with macroeconomic 
factors. Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006) find that their measure of consumer confidence 
is strongly correlated with contemporaneous macroeconomic variables and contains 
information about the future macroeconomic conditions (2006: 1511-1522). Table 2 
shows the correlations between the macroeconomic variables and sentiment measures 
used in this study.  
 
 
Table 2. Correlations between the macroeconomic variables. Bold entities represent statistical 
significance at a 10% level or less. Probability values are in parenthesis, below the correlation estimates. 
CCI is the consumer confidence index, ESI is the economic sentiment indicator, RATE is the 3-month 
Euribor rate, GDP is the moving average on quarterly change in GDP, UNEMP is the current 
unemployment rate and INDPRO is the growth in industrial production.  
  CCI  ESI  CPI  RATE  DUNEMP  MAVGDP  DDIV  INDPRO  
CCI  1,00 
       
 
----- 
       
ESI  0,83 1,00 
      
 
(0,000) ----- 
      
CPI  -0,34 -0,23 1,00 
     
 
(0,000) (0,003) ----- 
     
RATE  0,28 0,31 0,19 1,00 
    
 
(0,000) (0,000) (0,014) ----- 
    
DUNEMP  -0,59 -0,71 0,14 -0,27 1,00 
   
 
(0,000) (0,000) (0,063) (0,000) ----- 
   
MAVGDP  0,51 0,72 -0,05 0,52 -0,66 1,00 
  
 
(0,000) (0,000) (0,540) (0,000) (0,000) ----- 
  
DDIV  0,07 0,16 0,16 0,17 -0,13 0,25 1,00 
 
 
(0,386) (0,039) (0,044) (0,028) (0,099) (0,001) ----- 
 
INDPRO  0,24 0,25 -0,13 -0,01 -0,15 0,10 -0,09 1,00 
  (0,002) (0,001) (0,090) (0,863) (0,060) (0,194) (0,221) ----- 
 
 
Despite some dissimilarities in the surveys that ESI and CCI are based on, the measures 
are strongly positively correlated (0,83). Both sentiment measures show also strong 
correlations with the macroeconomic variables. The 3-month Euribor (RATE) is 
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strongly positively correlated with both measures of sentiment. Additionally, growth in 
GDP is positively related to CCI and ESI. Inflation and unemployment rate, on the other 
hand, exhibit a negative correlation with both sentiment measures, which is rational 
since inflation and unemployment can be interpreted as negative indicators for the 
overall economic development. Negative correlation between the sentiment measures 
and unemployment is especially strong. This finding is not surprising, since questions 
regarding unemployment play an important role in the surveys that CCI and ESI are 
based on. Dividend yield does not show a significant correlation with consumer 
confidence, while it is positively correlated with ESI. Additionally, Industrial 
production growth shows positive correlation with both sentiment measures. 
 
Following Chen (2011), Lemmon & Portniaguina (2006) and Kholdy & Sohrabia 
(2014) both of the sentiment indices are regressed on a set of macroeconomic variables 
in order to distinguish the irrational part of the overall-sentiment. The residual from 
these regressions is then used as proxy for irrational part of sentiment. Naturally, one 
must consider that there might be an important rational factor, which has not been 
included in the regression. However, after adjusting both sentiment measures on the 
macroeconomic variables, sentiment can be interpreted as a cleaner proxy of irrational 
sentiment. Macroeconomic variables used in this study are as follows: inflation, 
described by the monthly change in consumer price index (CPI), change in 3-month 
Euribor (RATE), change in the monthly industrial production growth (INDPRO), 
change in the monthly unemployment rate (UNEMP), moving average on quarterly 
GDP growth (GDP), and monthly dividend yield of OMXH25-index (DIV). Data of the 
macroeconomic indicators is downloaded from the official website of Bank Of Finland, 
Statistics Finland and Eurostat. In addition, data for the dividend yield is downloaded 
from Bloomberg data base.  The data consists of monthly observations excluding 
quarterly GDP growth. The regression is performed the following way 
 
(4) ADJSENTt = c +  β1 × ΔUNEMPt + β2 × ΔRATEt + β3 × 
       ΔINFLt + β4 ×  ΔINDPROt + β5 × ΔGDPt + β6 × ΔDIVt + β7 × ∆UNEMPt−1 +
       β8 ×  ΔRATEt−1 + β8 × ΔINFLt−1 + β10  × Δ INDPROt−1 +  β11 ×  ΔGDPt−1 +
       β12 × ΔDIVt−1 + εt, , 
 
where, 𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 is  Economic Sentiment Indicator or Consumer Confidence index, 
𝛥𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 is the change in monthly unemployment rate, 𝛥𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑡 is the change in 3-
month Euribor, 𝛥𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡 is the change in inflation measured by consumer price index, 
 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡 is the change in industrial production growth, and 𝛥𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  is the change in 
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gross domestic production growth (moving average), and 𝛥𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡 is the change in 
monthly dividend yield.  
 
 
4.3. Regression approach  
 
The impact of consumer confidence index and economic sentiment indicator on stock 
returns is studied using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach. Simple linear 
regression model is an econometric model used to investigate the relationship between 
the chosen economic variables. OLS is a method used to estimate the unknown 
parameters in a linear regression model. OLS determines the line of best fit in a linear 
regression model and minimizes the sum of squared residuals (Hill & al.1997:51). The 
fitted line is 
 
(5)  ŷ = 𝑏1+ 𝑏2 𝑥𝑡 
 
and the vertical distances from each point to the fitted line are the least squares 
residuals, are given by 
 
(6) et =  yt − ŷt = yt − b1 − b2t. 
 
OLS makes several assumptions regarding the ordinary least-squares estimates of its 
parameters, which are also known as the Gauss-Markov conditions. Violation of these 
conditions is likely to cause biased parameter estimates or biased estimates of the 
standard errors of sample statistics. In these cases, making any valid statistical 
inferences about the results is misleading. (Allen 1997: 181-182.) Under the Gauss-
Markov assumptions of the linear regression model, the estimators 𝑏1  and 𝑏2  have the 
smallest variance of all linear and unbiased estimators of 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 , thus they are the 
best linear unbiased estimators of 𝑏1  and 𝑏2. (Hill & al.1997: 77). The Gauss-Markov 
conditions are as follows (Woolridge 2013: 59- 60). 
 
1. Linearity in parameters 𝑦 =  𝛽𝑂 + 𝛽1𝑥 + u  
 
2. The expected value of the error term is zero for all observations E (u|x) = 0 
 
3. Homoscedasticity: The conditional variance of the error term is constant in all x and    
    over time Var(u|x) =𝜎2 
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3. Error term is independently distributed and not correlated: Cov (εi,εj) = E (εi, εj)= 0,      
    i≠ 𝑗 
 
4. 𝑋𝑖 is uncorrelated with the error term since 𝑥𝑖 is deterministic. 
 
T-test was used to test the statistical significance of the results. T-test follows the 
student t-distribution and the t-value of the least square estimate is obtained by 
 
(7) t =  
(β̂ − β0)
SE(β̂)
⁄ , 
 
where ?̂?, is the estimated coefficient, 𝛽0 is the slope of the regression, and  𝑆𝐸(?̂?) is the 
standard deviation of ?̂?. The null hypothesis is that 0ˆ:0 H , and the alternative is 
0ˆ:1 H . If the t-statistics exceeds the critical value, null hypothesis is rejected and 
coefficient is said to be significantly different from zero. (Hill& al. 1997: 105.) 
  
The coefficient of determination, denoted  𝑅2, indicates the goodness of fit on the OLS 
regression line on the data. 𝑅2 is the ratio of the explained variation in y, which is 
explained by x. The coefficient of determination can be defined as 
 
(8) 𝑅2 = SSE/SST = 1- SSR/SST, 
 
Where SSE is the explained sum of squares, SST is the total sum of squares and SSR is 
the residual sum of squares. If 𝑅2 equals 1, this indicates that all the data lie on the same 
line, thus OLS provides a perfect fit for the data. (Woolridge 2013:3 7-38).  
 
4.4. Preliminary tests 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) assumes that the means and variances of the variables 
being used in the model are constant over time. If the means and variances change over 
time, the variables are defined as non-stationary or unit root variables. In contrast, 
stationary process can be defined so that it has a mean, variance and autocorrelation that 
are constant over time. Running regressions with nonstationary data can result in 
misleading results and spurious regressions. In spurious regressions R-square values 
and t-statistics no longer follow usual distributions and appear larger. Therefore, testing 
of unit roots of the series is a precondition for using OLS method. (Glynn, Perera & 
Verma 2007: 65.) The stationarity of the data is tested using Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
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(ADF) test, which is an extension of the popular Dickey-Fuller and allows for the 
possibility that the error term is autocorrelated.  Considering the autoregressive model 
 
(9)  Yt =  ρYt−1 + et, t = 1,2 …,  
 
Where 𝑌0=0, 𝜌 is a real number and 𝑒𝑡, is a sequence of independent normal random 
variables with mean zero and variance, 𝜎2. The non-stationarity (with intercept) can be 
tested by the equation 
 
(10) ∆yt =  α +  θyt−1 + ε 
 
The null hypothesis that 𝐻0: 𝜃 = 0 against the alternative 𝐻1: 𝜃 < 0. If we reject the 
null, we conclude that the series is stationary. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (with 
intercept) on the other hand is done following the equation: 
 
(11) ∆𝑧𝑡=𝛼0+ 𝜃𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝛼1∆𝑧𝑡−1 +  𝛼2∆𝑧𝑡−2 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑝∆𝑧𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑎𝑡, 
 
where p is the number of augmenting lags and 𝜃 is the ordinary least squares estimate. 
The number of lags is determined by minimizing the Akaike information criterion. The 
same null hypothesis applies to Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, 𝐻0: 𝜃 = 0 against the 
alternative 𝐻1:  𝜃 < 0.  
 
Results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test are shown in Table 3. Unemployment 
rate (UNEMP), 3-month Euribor (RATE), and inflation are non-stationary at levels. 
Adding a trend does not change the results. Industrial production growth (INDPRO) and 
dividend yield are both integrated at I(0). For CCI and ESI null of a unit root is rejected 
at 5 % and 10% level respectively, when only an intercept is included in the equation. 
By adding a trend, both series incorporate a unit root. Thus, the results for ESI and CCI 
are not clear judging by the Augmented-Dickey Fuller test. However, all the variables 
which are non-stationary at levels become stationary when first differenced. It is a 
commonly known fact that many unit root tests fail to reject the null of a unit root for 
economic time series. The standard conclusion is that most economic time series 
incorporate a unit root. However, in many unit root tests, such as Augmented Dickey 
Fuller and Phillips-Perron, unit root is the null to be tested. As the classical economic 
hypothesis testing is performed so that the null is accepted, unless there is strong 
evidence against the null, it is likely that unit root tests are not powerful against the 
relevant alternative (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992: 160). 
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Table 3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test including an intercept, and intercept and trend. Lag 
length criteria is based on automatic Akaike information. Table presents p-values and bolded values 
denote statistical significance at 10% level or less.  
 
Intercept Trend and intercept 
UNEMP 0,387 0,906 
ESI 0,060 0,154 
CCI 0,047 0,138 
INDPRO 0,000 0,000 
RATE 0,399 0,196 
GDP 0,072 0,060 
INFLATION 0,256 0,494 
DIV 0,023 0,045 
 
 
In the case of CCI and ESI, it is clear that these series do not incorporate a unit root in 
the long-run and that the unit root is only due to a finite sample; both confidence 
indicators are arithmetic means of seasonally adjusted balances of responses to a 
number of questions, and the balances are calculated as the difference between positive 
and negative answers. In order to further test, if the series contain a unit root, I apply the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test. KPSS is a stationarity test, which 
differs from Augmented-Dickey fuller test in so that the null of to be tested is that the 
series does not contain a unit root.  Hence, the series 𝑦𝑡 is assumed to be (trend-) 
stationary. The KPSS is based form the OLS regression of 𝑦𝑡 on the exogenous variable 
𝑥𝑡: 
 
(12) yt = xt
′δ + ut 
 
The LM statistic is defined the following way: 
 
(13)  LM =  ∑ St (t)
2/(T2 ∫ 0),  
 
where ∫ 0 is an estimator of the residual spectrum at frequency zero and 𝑆(𝑡) is a 
cumulative residual function. 
 
(14) S(t) =  ∑ ℧r
t
r=1   
 
Based on the residuals ℧𝑡= yt = xt
′δ(0). (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992: 163-165). Test 
results from the KPSS test of stationarity are presented in Table 4. The results show that 
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stationarity (with intercept) is rejected for unemployment rate (UNEMP), 3-month 
Euribor (RATE), and for growth in GDP. When trend is included, unemployment rate, 
rate, inflation, and dividend yield seem to be nonstationary. However, all the 
nonstationary series become stationary after first differencing.  
 
 
Table 4. Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test of stationarity. Bandwidth Newey-West 
automatic using Bartlett kernel. Results are given including an intercept (first row) and including and 
intercept and trend (second row). Asymptotic critical values *) are denoted below the table. Bolded 
values denote that the null of stationarity is rejected at 10% level or less. 
 
 
  UNEMP ESI CCI INDPRO RATE GDP INFLATION DIV   
Intercept 0,481 0,240 0,330 0,169 0,910 0,403 0,283 0,153 
 
Trend and 
intercept 0,272 0,113 0,092 0,057 0,154 0,058 0,124 0,122   
 
*) KPPS Critical values 
(intercept) KPPS Critical values (trend and intercept) 
 
1% level*** 0,739 
 
1% level*** 0,216 
 
5% level** 0,463 
 
5% level** 0,146 
 
10% level* 0,347 
 
10% level* 0,119 
 
 
OLS includes an assumption that the error terms are homoscedastic meaning that the 
conditional variance of the error term is constant, thus E(𝜀𝑖
2) = 𝜎𝑡
2. If this does not hold 
true, the error term heteroscedastic. Heteroscedasticity has serious consequences for the 
OLS estimator and it results in false estimated standard errors. This, on the other hand, 
implies that the confidence intervals and hypotheses test become unreliable.  
Additionally, OLS method requires that there exists no serial correlation. Serial 
correlation means that the residuals of the variables are correlated with their own lagged 
values. This is a statistical problem, since it violates the standard assumption that error 
terms are uncorrelated. Serial correlation can result in invalid standard errors and t-
statistics as well as biased coefficients. In the case of lagged dependent variables, 
coefficients may be biased and inconsistent. Time series data typically exhibits some 
unknown form of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. In these cases, it is essential 
to use covariance matrix estimators that are able to consistently estimate the covariance 
of the model parameters. Heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the regressions is 
taken care of by using HAC Newey-West (1987) procedure, which can be used when 
the Gauss-Markov assumptions do not apply. HAC Newey-West procedure estimates 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation consistent standard errors (Müller 2014: 311).  
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4.4.1. Granger causality and Toda-Yamamoto procedure 
 
One of the most common ways to test causality between variables is the Granger-
Causality test by W. Grager (1969). Granger (non-) causality provides a definition for 
causal ordering of time series, which implies a parametric model for stationary 
processes. Granger causality is widely used to explore causal ordering of variables 
given multivariate time series (Yue et al. (2015).  Granger causality test is based on the 
Vector Auto-regressions (VAR) frame work, where the null hypothesis is formulated as 
zero restrictions on the coefficients of the lags of a subset of the variable. Let 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 
be two stationary series with zero means. The simple causal model can be put in the 
following form 
 
(15)  𝑋𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑖+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇1𝑡  
 
(16)  𝑌𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑐𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑋𝑡−𝑖+ ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇2𝑡 , 
 
Where disturbance terms 𝜇1𝑡 and 𝜇2𝑡 are assumed to be uncorrelated white-noise series. 
In equations X and X, m can equal infinity, but in practice, given the finite sample, m is 
assumed to be shorter than the given time series. Equation 13 states that 𝑌𝑡  is causing 
𝑋𝑡 provided 𝛽𝑗 does not equal zero. Similarly in equation 14,  𝑋𝑡 is causing𝑌𝑡 given that 
𝑐𝑖 is not zero. In the case that both of these events occur, there exists a feedback 
relationship between 𝑋𝑡and 𝑌𝑡.  (Granger 1969: 431.) 
 
The usual Wald test statistic for Granger non-causality, based on levels estimation, has a 
nonstandard asymptonic distribution, and depends on nuisance parameters in general, if 
the process is integrated in the first order. Thus, problem in testing Granger non-
causality occurs, if the series is integrated in different orders. As seen from the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results in Table 3 and from the KPSS results in Table 4, 
series used in this study seem to be integrated in different orders.  Toda & Yamamoto 
(1995) propose a way to overcome this problem by using a method that is applicable 
whether the VAR’s are stationary, integrated of an arbitrary order or cointegrated of an 
arbitrary order. (Toda & Yamamoto 1995: 226-227.) By using the Toda & Yamamoto 
method one can apply the usual lag length selection procedure to a possibly integrated 
or cointegrated VAR. After choosing a lag length k, one can estimate a (k + 𝑑max )th-
order VAR, in which 𝑑max is the maximal order of integration that is suspected to occur 
in the process. The coefficient matrices of the last 𝑑max  lagged vectors in the model are 
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ignored and the linear on non-linear restrictions on the first k coefficient matrices can be 
tested using the standard asymptonic theory. (Toda & Yamamoto 1995: 246.) 
 
I test for the Granger non-causality by first estimating the following VAR-model. 
 
(17)  Yt = a0  + a1Yt−1+ ..... + akYt−k + b1Xt−1+ ..... + bkXt−k + ut 
(18)  Xt = c0  + c1Xt−1+ ..... + ckXt−k + d1Yt−1+ ..... + dkYt−k + vt    
              
With the null 𝐻0: 𝑏1= 𝑏2 = ..... = 𝑏0 =0, which implies that 𝑋𝑡 does not cause 𝑌𝑡. 
Similarly testing the 𝐻0: that 𝑑1= 𝑑2 = ..... = 𝑑0 =0 implies that 𝑌𝑡 does not cause 𝑋𝑡. 
According to the unit root test results, the maximum order of integration in the series is 
1, thus m=1. In accordance with Toda-Yamamoto (1995) procedure a VAR-model is set 
in the levels of the data.  
 
 Table 5 shows the lag-length criteria used in the VAR-model. It is important to 
determine the number of lags (k) in an appropriate manner, as results from the Granger-
causality test depend heavily on the number of lags given. Each of the criteria suggests 
lag order of two for the VAR-model. However, the results from LM serial correlation 
test show that the residuals are serially correlated, which results in that the VAR-model 
is not well-specified. 
 
 
Table 5. Lag order selection criteria. * denotes lag order suggested by the criterion: sequential modified 
LR test statistic (LR) , Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criterion AIC, Schwartz 
information criterion(SC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ). 
 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ   
0 1970,73 NA 6,4E-25 -24,50 -24,29 -24,41 
 1 2317,03 640,67* 3,82e-26* -27,31* -24,78* -26,28* 
 2 2390,60 125,99 7,1E-26 -26,72 -21,86 -24,75 
 3 2481,36 142,95 1,1E-25 -26,34 -19,15 -23,42 
 4 2567,38 123,65 1,9E-25 -25,90 -16,39 -22,04 
 5 2665,29 127,27 2,9E-25 -25,62 -13,78 -20,81 
 6 2772,54 124,68 4,5E-25 -25,44 -11,28 -19,69 
 7 2906,15 136,95 5,7E-25 -25,60 -9,11 -18,91 
 8 3043,17 121,61 8,3E-25 -25,80 -6,99 -18,16   
 
The results of LM serial correlation test suggests that the residual autocorrelation can be 
taken care of by increasing the lag order to k=12. Hence, lag order is increased in order 
to obtain a well-specified model. After estimating VAR-model with suggested 
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appropriate lag-length, Granger-Causality Block Exoqeneity Wald-test is applied. 
Additional lag (m=1) is added to the model as an exogenous variable, so that Wald-
statistic has it usual asymptonic chi-square null-distribution. The results for the 
Granger-causality test are shown in the next section. 
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5. RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
 
Firstly, I test for the Granger-Causality between the sentiment measures and stock 
returns. Granger-Causality is a simple way to test time-series dependencies between the 
chosen variables. As stated earlier, the series is integrated in different orders. Hence, 
instead of using the traditional Granger-Causality test, I apply the Toda-Yomamoto 
(1995) method. The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Granger-Causality Block Exoqeneity Wald-test. Causality between the sentiment measures and 
index returns. Bolded p-values denote statistical significance at 10% level or less. 
 
                  
 
Growth Large 
Large 
Growth 
Large 
Value Small 
Small 
Growth 
Small 
Value Value OMXH 
CCI→r 0,750 0,888 0,236 0,937 0,009 0,001 0,279 0,491 0,567 
r→CCI 0,446 0,817 0,965 0,916 0,200 0,647 0,542 0,699 0,512 
          ESI→r 0,684 0,774 0,529 0,781 0,008 0,138 0,182 0,478 0,533 
r→CCI 0,526 0,190 0,901 0,733 0,715 0,547 0,444 0,996 0,273 
 
 
Results from the Granger-Causality test indicate that there does not exist two-way 
causality between the sentiment measures and stock returns in any case. Consumer 
confidence granger-causes returns of small and small growth indices at 1% level, but 
there exists no feed-back effect from the returns back to CCI. In addition, Economic 
sentiment indicator granger-causes the returns of the small index, but is itself not caused 
by the returns on the index. Hence, the past levels of consumer confidence and 
economic sentiment incorporate information that is useful in predicting returns on small 
stock and small growth stocks, but the past stock returns do not seem to have any 
predictive power on levels of sentiment. These findings supports the view that 
consumers primarily hold small stocks, as consumer confidence only affects returns on 
those indices. However, it seems past stock returns are not an essential factor in the 
formation of confidence.  Moreover, it is interesting to note that according to the results 
there appears to be no dependency between the sentiment measures and OMXH-index. 
This finding does not support the second hypothesis that sentiment would have an 
influence on the aggregate market returns. On the other hand, these findings give 
support for the first hypothesis that the impact of sentiment has a stronger effect on the 
returns of small stocks, while the results show causality running from sentiment only to 
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the returns of small stocks.  The results here are partially in line with Brown and Cliff 
(2004), who find that causality runs from sentiment to small stocks but not to large 
stocks. However, they also find causality running from small and large stocks to 
sentiment, which is contradicting to my results. Also Schmeling (2009) finds two-way 
causality between confidence measures and stock returns for aggregate market as well 
as for value and growth stocks.  
 
5.1. Stock returns and changes in sentiment 
To investigate the impacts of sentiment on stock returns further I test, if changes in the 
sentiment measures affect the returns of the stock indices. Following Fisher and 
Statman (2000), I take the first difference of Consumer Confidence Index and Economic 
Sentiment Indicator and run the following regression 
 
(19)  𝑅𝑡 = 𝑐 +  𝛽1∆𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 +  𝑒𝑡, 
 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the (log) return of a chosen stock index  ∆𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇 is the change in either CCI 
or ESI, and 𝑒𝑡 is the error term. 
 
The results for the impact of contemporaneous change in CCI or ESI are seen in Table 
7. As seen in Panel A, contemporaneous changes in CCI have a statistically significant 
impact on Small, Growth and Small Value index, which are considered to be more 
speculative compared to large and value stock indices. This finding is in line with Fisher 
and Statman (2003) and Brown and Cliff (2004). The R-squares of the regression show 
that the variance of Consumer Confidence index explains 6 percent of the variance of 
the Small index returns and 5% of the variance of Small Growth and Small Value index 
returns. 
 
Changes is Economic Sentiment Indicator, on the other hand, have a statistically 
significant impact on all the index returns at a 10% level or less. Additionally, 
contemporaneous changes in ESI seem to have significant effect on stock returns in 
general as the impact is statistically significant for OMXH-index returns. The R-square 
of the regression shows that variance in ESI explains 7% of the variance of OMXH-
index returns. In addition, changes in ESI explain 8% of the variance of Value index. 
The results suggest that ESI incorporates more explanatory power on all the index 
returns compared to CCI, as the R-squares are higher in every case and the coefficients 
are more significant. ESI is based on a variety of different confidence indicators and the 
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surveys are targeted to firm managers, whereas consumer confidence surveys are 
targeted to households who are more likely to be small stock holders.   
 
 
Table 7.  Monthly index returns (log) regressed on contemporaneous changes in CCI and ESI. Bold 
entities represent statistical significance at 10% percent level or less. The standard errors are estimated 
with HAC Newey-West procedure (Newey-West automatic bandwidth and lag length). * Statistically 
significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, *** Statistically significant at 1 % level. 
 
 
  Panel A     Panel B     
  
 
    c ∆CCI R2 c ∆ESI R2      
 
 
Growth -0,003 0,000 0,00 -0,002 0,007** 0,04  
 
 
  
(-0,34) (0,14) 
 
(-0,29) (2,20) 
  
 
 
Large 
-0,006 -0,002 0,00 -0,005 0,006* 0,03 
 
 
  
(-0,75) (-0,72) 
 
(-0,60) (1,90) 
  
 
 
Large 
Growth -0,001 -0,001 0,00 0,000 0,006** 0,03 
 
 
  
(-0,55) (-0,32) 
 
(0,01) (2,02) 
  
 
 
Large 
Value 0,001 0,000 0,00 0,001 0,004* 0,02 
 
 
  
(0,14) (-0,17) 
 
(0,23) (1,88) 
  
 
 
Value 0,002 0,001 0,00 0,002 0,006*** 0,08 
 
 
  
(0,34) (0,61) 
 
(0,47) (4,75) 
  
 
 
Small 0,008 0,006** 0,06 0,008 0,005*** 0,07 
 
 
  
(1,49) (2,12) 
 
(1,68) (3,14) 
  
 
 
Small 
Growth 0,001 0,007** 0,05 0,001 0,006*** 0,07 
 
 
  
(0,15) (2,08) 
 
(0,19) (3,12) 
  
 
 
Small 
Value 0,010* 0,006** 0,05 0,010* 0,005*** 0,07 
 
 
  
(1,88) (2,17) 
 
(1,78) (2,71) 
  
 
 
OMXH 0,000 0,002 0,00 0,001 0,006*** 0,07 
 
 
  
(0,06) (0,70) 
 
(0,18) (3,00) 
 
 
   
 
 
Many papers show evidence that survey measures of sentiment exhibit forecasting 
power on stock returns. The forecasting ability of changes in two sentiment measures is 
tested with a forecast horizon of one month and two months. The equation can be put in 
the form of 
 
(20) 𝑅𝑡 = 𝑐 +  + 𝛽1∆𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 +  𝑒𝑡, 
 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the (log) return of a chosen stock index  ∆𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 is the change in either 
CCI or ESI with the chosen forecast horizon and 𝑒𝑡 is the error term. As the results in 
Table 8 show, changes in both sentiment measures appear to have some forecasting 
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power on the stock index returns. CCI in the previous month has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the returns of Small Growth index, Small index, and 
Small Value index. These results support the findings of Fisher and Statman (2003), 
who report that the predictive power of sentiment is especially pronounced for return
s on small stocks. Additionally, Schmeling (2009) finds that consumer confidence 
predicts returns on small stocks on a short-horizon. They, however, report a negative 
relationship between sentiment and subsequent stock returns, which is in support of the 
investor overreaction theory. The same effect is not observed here. As seen in Table 8, 
the R-squares reveal that the variation in sentiment, measured by CCI and ESI, explains 
the variation in stock returns very modestly, thus the predictive power is relatively 
weak. The unexpected sign of the sentiment coefficient may be explained by the weak 
overall explanatory power of sentiment.  
 
 
Table 8. Monthly index (log) returns are matched with the change in CCI (Panel A) and ESI (Panel B) in 
the previous. The standard errors are estimated with HAC Newey-West procedure (Newey-West 
automatic bandwidth and lag length). * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 
5% level,*** Statistically significant at 1 % level. 
 
 
  Panel A       Panel B 
 
  
 
  
 
c ∆𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 R2  c ∆𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑡−1 R2   
 
 
Growth -0,002 0,000 0,00 
 
-0,002 -0,003 0,01 
 
  
(-0,20) (-0,05) 
  
(-0,24) (-1,23) 
  
 
Value 0,002 0,003 0,01 
 
0,002 0,001 0,00 
 
  
(0,32) (1,36) 
  
(0,29) (1,15) 
  
 
Large -0,004 0,000 0,00 
 
-0,005 -0,003 0,01 
 
  
(-0,59) (-0,02) 
  
(-0,59) (-1,16) 
  
 
Large 
Growth 0,000 -0,002 0,00 
 
-0,003 -0,004* 0,01 
 
  
(-0,39) (-0,34) 
  
(0,00) (-1,76) 
  
 
Large 
Value 0,002 0,002 0,00 
 
0,002 0,001 0,00 
 
  
(0,27) (0,83) 
  
(0,27) (0,80) 
  
 
OMXH 0,001 0,001 0,00 
 
0,001 -0,001 0,00 
 
  
(0,22) (0,80) 
  
(0,179 (-0,45) 
  
 
Small 
Growth 0,002 0,004** 0,02 
 
0,002 0,003* 0,02 
 
  
(0,27) (2,11) 
  
(0,25) (1,89) 
  
 
Small 0,008 0,004** 0,02 
 
0,008 0,003*** 0,03 
 
  
(1,35) (2,27) 
  
(1,39) (3,27) 
  
 
Small 
Value 0,010 0,004** 0,02 
 
0,010 0,003*** 0,02 
  
 
(1,66) (2,15) 
  
(1,54) (2,91) 
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Results are similar in the case of ESI; a positive change in ESI in the previous month 
has a positive and significant impact on the returns of small growth, small and small 
value indices. ESI has only significant negative impact on the returns of large growth 
index. Again, all though the estimates of sentiment are statistically significant, the R-
squares show that ESI has almost no explanatory power on the returns of the indices. 
Again, it is not surprising that the estimates of CCI and ESI are positive, on the contrary 
to what was expected, since their impact on returns is so modest in general. When the 
forecast horizon is extended to two months, forecasting power of ESI disappears. ESI 
seems to have a statistically significant negative impact only on the returns of Large 
Value stocks. Nevertheless, the result is significant on a 10% level, which indicates that 
it may be solely due to chance.  The results are similar to Fisher and Statman (2000) 
who were also not able to find a significant forecasting power of changes in sentiment 
on stock returns. 
 
 
Table 9. Monthly index (log) returns are matched with the change in CCI (Panel A) and ESI two months 
before. The standard errors are estimated with HAC Newey-West procedure (Newey-West automatic 
bandwidth and lag length). * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% 
level,*** Statistically significant at 1 % level. 
 
 
  Panel A         Panel B   
 
  
 
c ∆𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡−2 R2  c ∆𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑡−2 R2  
 
Growth 
0,001 0,003 0,00 
 
0,001 -0,003 0,01 
 
  
(0,15) (0,93) 
  
(0,08) (-0,88) 
  
 
Value 0,003 0,000 0,00 
 
0,002 -0,002 0,01 
 
  
(0,48) (0,21) 
  
(0,39) (-1,45) 
  
 
Large -0,002 0,000 0,00 
 
-0,002 -0,005 0,02 
 
  
(-0,26) (-0,03) 
  
(-0,32) (-1,58) 
  
 
Large 
Growth 0,003 0,002 0,00 
 
-0,001 -0,003 0,01 
 
  
(0,39) (0,81) 
  
(-0,12) (-0,98) 
  
 
Large 
Value 0,001 -0,002 0,00 
 
0,001 -0,003* 0,02 
 
  
(0,21) (-0,70) 
  
(0,16) (-1,85) 
  
 
OMXH 
0,003 0,001 0,00 
 
0,003 -0,002 0,01 
 
  
(0,55) (0,58) 
  
(0,45) (-1,02) 
  
 
Small 
Growth 0,003 0,001 0,00 
 
0,003 0,000 0,00 
 
  
(0,50) (0,81) 
  
(0,46) (0,14) 
  
 
Small 0,008 0,002 0,00 
 
0,008 0,000 0,00 
 
  
(1,32) (1,20) 
  
(1,25) (-0,07) 
  
 
Small 
Value 0,010 0,002 0,00 
 
0,009 0,000 0,00 
   
 
(1,50) (1,03) 
  
(1,61) (0,24) 
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5.2. Adjusted sentiment and stock returns 
Prior literature suggests that consumer confidence might incorporate a component 
which is not explained by rational fundamentals. Thus, when using the raw sentiment 
indices as explanatory variables for stock returns, one cannot be sure of whether the 
results are due to correlation of the sentiment indices with business cycle. In order to 
address this issue, both confidence indices are regressed on a set of macroeconomic 
variables and their lagged values to account for the issue that some proxies might take 
longer to affect consumer confidence. The variables are chosen following Lemmon & 
Portniaguina (2006) and Chen (2011), who find that a substantial amount of consumer 
confidence is explained by macro fundamentals. Table 9 describes the results of the 
equation for CCI and Table 10, for ESI.  
 
 
 
Table 10. Economic Sentiment Indicator regressed on macroeconomic factors.  Entities in middle 
represent coefficients for each independent variable. Right hand side of the table represents t-values of the 
coefficients. ΔUNEMPt is the monthly change in unemployment rate, ΔINFLt is the monthly change in 
CPI, ΔRATEt is the change in 3-month Euribor rate, ΔGDPt is a moving average of the change in quarterly 
GDP growth, ∆DIV is the monthly change in OMXH25 dividend yield, and ΔINDPROt is the change in 
industrial production growth. Bolded values indicate statistical significance at 10% or less. * Statistically 
significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level,*** Statistically significant at 1 % 
level. 𝑅2= 0,74.  
 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
 
 
C 103,47*** 131,56 
 
 
ΔUNEMPt -18,13*** -2,79 
 
 
ΔRATEt 13,84*** 5,84 
 
 
 INDPROt 0,14 0,86 
 
 
∆DIVt 0,82 1,07 
 
 
GDPt 0,58** 2,36 
 
 
ΔINFLt 0,61 0,95 
 
 
ΔRATEt−1 4,67* 1,74 
 
 
 INDPROt−1 0,09 0,53 
 
 
∆DIVt−1 0,31 0,43 
 
 
GDPt−1 -0,12 -0,60 
 
 
ΔINFLt−1 -2,17*** -3,11 
 
 
ΔUNEMPt−1 -27,18*** -4,28 
 
 
     
 
The adjusted R-square of the regression is 0,74 for Economic Sentiment Indicator and 
0.62 for Consumer Confidence, indicating that variation in the macroeconomic 
fundamentals explain a significant proportion of the variation in both sentiment 
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measures. Moreover, the estimates of the macro variables are consistent with the 
economic intuition that counter-cyclical factors decrease confidence in the economy and 
pro-cyclical factors increase it; the estimates of interest rate and unemployment are 
negative whereas GDP-growth has a positive sign.  Following Chen (2011) the residual 
of the regression is then treated as the irrational measure of sentiment, in other words, 
the adjusted sentiment. It is likely, that the residual of the regression incorporates other 
rational factors that have not been included in the regression. However, the residual is 
treated at least a cleaner measure of irrational sentiment.  
 
The change in 3-month Euribor seems to have the strong impact on ESI, both on a 
contemporaneous level and in the previous month. Also the growth in GDP has a 
positive impact on ESI on a contemporaneous level.  Contemporaneous unemployment 
as well as lagged unemployment have a strong negative impact on economic sentiment. 
Additionally, lagged inflation appears to affect ESI negatively. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Consumer Confidence Index regressed on macroeconomic factors.  Entities in middle represent 
coefficients for each independent variable. Right hand side of the table represents t-values of the 
coefficients. ΔUNEMPt is the monthly change in unemployment rate, ΔINFLt is the monthly change in 
CPI, ΔRATEt is the change in 3-month Euribor rate, ΔGDPt is a moving average of the change in quarterly 
GDP growth, ∆DIV is the monthly change in OMXH25 dividend yield, and ΔINDPROt is the change in 
industrial production growth. Bolded values indicate statistical significance at 10% or less. * Statistically 
significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level,*** Statistically significant at 1 % 
level. 𝑅2= 0,62. 
 
  Variable Coefficient t-statistics   
 
C 14,59*** 19,79 
 
 
ΔUNEMPt -14,77** -2,42 
 
 
ΔRATEt 11,62*** 5,23 
 
 
 INDPROt -0,02 -0,14 
 
 
∆DIVt -0,12 -0,16 
 
 
GDPt 0,53** 2,29 
 
 
ΔINFLt 0,48 0,80 
 
 
ΔRATEt−1 -0,77 -0,31 
 
 
 INDPROt−1 0,10 0,64 
 
 
∆DIVt−1 -0,35 -0,52 
 
 
GDPt−1 -0,36** -1,99 
 
 
ΔINFLt−1 -2,01*** -3,07 
   ΔUNEMPt−1 -5,29 -0,89   
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Comparing the results in Table 10 and 11, the macroeconomic variables seem to do a 
better job in explaining ESI compared to CCI. The adjusted R-square shows, that the 
macro variables explain approximately 62% of the variation in the level on CCI. As 
ESI, Consumer Confidence is positively affected by the contemporaneous change in 3-
month Euribor (ΔRATEt) and the contemporaneous growth in GDP. The 
contemporaneous growth in unemployment rate has a negative impact on CCI. The 
negative effect is not surprising as the growth in unemployment is one of the key factors 
determining the level on consumer confidence indicator. In addition, the lagged 
inflation has a significantly negative impact on the level of consumer confidence.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the adjusted ESI and CCI over the sample period. Both figures 
line up well with recent booms and crashes in the markets. The crash of the dot-com 
boom in the beginning of 20th can be seen in as a substantial decrease in confidence in 
the beginning of 2001. Another notable decline in the adjusted CCI can be observed in 
the middle of 2007, when the subprime crisis escalated. Adjusted CCI also experiences 
a sharp rise around 2010, which is followed by a major decline in 2011, which might 
reflect consumers’ views about the unstable financial situation in Europe at that time. 
The sub-prime credit crisis in the US affected the in financial sectors especially in 
Europe. The deterioration of the in the financial sectors of the US and Europe 
destabilized national financial systems all over the world and led to the global financial 
crisis. (Moshirian 2011: 510.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Adjusted Economic Sentiment Indicator over the sample period from January 2001 to 
December 2014. 
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Comparing the figures of adjusted sentiment measures, CCI exhibits larger deviations 
during the overall sample period compared to ESI. This might be due to the fact that 
consumer confidence surveys are targeted to households, whereas economic sentiment 
survey is mostly targeted firm managers. Consumers might not be as consistent in their 
economic views and expectations, compared to managers. As in the case of adjusted 
CCI, adjusted measure of ESI also shows a sharp decrease during 2001, when the dot-
com boom deflated. Another notable decline in the index is seen during the financial 
crisis in 2007-2008. Compared to adjusted CCI, economic sentiment does not drop as 
strongly in the beginning of 2011, although it does experience several downward shifts. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Adjusted Consumer Confidence Index over the sample period from January 2001 to December 
2014.  
 
 
Next we address if the adjusted sentiment indices have forecasting power on the returns 
of the stock indices. This regression is performed the following way:  
 
(21)  𝑅𝑡 = 𝑐 +  𝛽1 𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡, 
 
where  Rt is the return (logarithm) of a given index at time t and ADJSENTt−1 is the 
lagged value of the adjusted measure of consumer confidence or economic sentiment 
indicator. Special attention is paid on the coefficient sign of 𝛽1, which implicates if 
subsequent returns are negatively related to increase in previous sentiment.  Table 12 
summarizes the results for the impact of adjusted sentiment with one-month lag on 
stock index returns. As shown in Panel A, adjusted consumer confidence has virtually 
no effect on any of the index returns on a one month-forecast horizon. Adjusted CCI has 
a negative effect on the returns of the value index. However, the effect is significant 
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only on a 10% level. As with adjusted CCI, adjusted ESI does not seem to have an 
impact on most of the index returns. An increase in adjusted ESI in the previous month 
is negatively related to the returns of large value and value indices. The results show 
that adjusted ESI explains the variation in returns of large value and value index 
modestly, as the R-squares of the regressions are 2% and 3 % respectively. 
 
 
Table 12. Index returns regressed on adjusted CCI (Panel A) and adjusted ESI (Panel B) with a one-
month forecast horizon. Bold entities represent statistical significance at 10% level or less. The standard 
errors are estimated with HAC Newey-West procedure (Newey-West automatic bandwidth and lag 
length). * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level, *** Statistically 
significant at 1 % level.  
  
Panel A 
   
Panel B 
  
  
C 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 R2 c 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑡−1 R2 
 
 
Growth -0,002 -0,001 0,00 -0,002 -0,002 0,01 
 
  
(-0,20) (-0,65) 
 
(-0,21) (-0,86) 
  
 
Large -0,004 -0,002 0,00 -0,004 -0,003 0,02 
 
  
(-0,54) (-1,04) 
 
(-0,54) (-1,48) 
  
 
Large 
Growth -0,003 -0,001 0,00 -0,003 -0,002 0,00 
 
  
(-0,36) (-0,60) 
 
(-0,36) (-0,78) 
  
 
Large 
Value 0,001 -0,002 0,01 0,001 -0,003* 0,02 
 
  
(0,13) (-1,45) 
 
(0,13) (-1,79) 
  
 
OMXH 0,001 -0,001 0,01 0,001 -0,002 0,01 
 
  
(0,21) (-1,13) 
 
(0,23) (-1,22) 
  
 
Small 0,008 -0,001 0,00 0,008 0,000 0,00 
 
  
(1,16) (-0,70) 
 
(1,16) (-0,36) 
  
 
Small 
Growth 0,003 0,000 0,00 0,003 0,000 0,00 
 
  
(0,44) (-0,27) 
 
(0,43) (-0,11) 
  
 
Small 
Value 0,009 -0,001 0,01 0,009 0,000 0,00 
 
  
(1,32) (-0,90) 
 
(1,32) (-0,35) 
  
 
Value 0,002 -0,002* 0,01 0,002 -0,003** 0,03 
 
  
(0,39) (-1,76) 
 
(0,40) (-2,10) 
   
 
 
Results in Table 13 show that when the forecast horizon is extended to two months, 
adjusted consumer confidence has a statistically significant negative impact on the 
returns of large value index and small value index. Hence, as the investor sentiment 
increases, returns on large and small value index decrease. Adjusted CCI no longer 
impacts the value index returns, as it did on a one-month forecast horizon. Again, the R-
squares implicate that variation in adjusted CCI on a two-month forecast horizon 
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explain only 3% and 2% of the variation in large value index and small value index 
respectively. On the contrary, adjusted ESI maintains it explanatory power on large 
value and small value index. An increase in adjusted ESI results in a 0,5 % decrease in 
the returns of large value index. Moreover, the variance in adjusted ESI explains 6% of 
the variance in large value index returns. For small index and small value index, an 
increase in adjusted ESI leads to 0,3% and 0,2% decrease in their returns, respectively.  
 
 
Table 13. Index returns regressed on adjusted CCI (Panel A) and adjusted ESI (Panel B) with a two-
month forecast-horizon Bold entities represent statistical significance at 10% level or less. The standard 
errors are estimated with HAC Newey-West procedure (Newey-West automatic bandwidth and lag 
length). * Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level,*** Statistically 
significant at 1 % level. 
  
Panel A 
   
Panel B 
  
  
c 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡−2 R2 c 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑡−2 R2 
 
 
Growth -0,001 -0,001 0,00 -0,001 -0,001 0,02 
 
  
(-0,13) (-0,67) 
 
(-0,13) (-0,54) 
  
 
Large -0,004 -0,002 0,01 -0,004 -0,003 0,02 
 
  
(-0,47) (-1,28) 
 
(-0,48) (-1,58) 
  
 
Large 
Growth -0,003 -0,001 0,00 -0,002 -0,001 0,00 
 
  
(-0,29) (-0,47) 
 
(-0,30) (-0,28) 
  
 
Large 
Value 0,001 -0,004** 0,03 0,001 -0,005*** 0,06 
 
  
(0,09) (-2,18) 
 
(0,09) (-4,37) 
  
 
OMXH 0,002 -0,002 0,01 0,002 -0,002 0,02 
 
  
(0,29) (-1,55) 
 
(0,27) (-1,61) 
  
 
Small 0,007 -0,002 0,02 0,007 -0,003* 0,03 
 
  
(1,12) (-1,65) 
 
(1,09) (-1,92) 
  
 
Small 
Growth 0,003 -0,002 0,01 0,003 -0,002 0,01 
 
  
(0,38) (-1,18) 
 
(0,36) (-1,14) 
  
 
Small 
Value 0,009 -0,002* 0,02 0,009 -0,002* 0,02 
 
  
(1,32) (-1,73) 
 
(1,28) (-1,73) 
  
 
Value 0,002 -0,003 0,02 0,002 -0,002 0,06 
 
  (0,45) (-2,09) 
 
(0,27) (-1,61) 
  
 
 
On a three-month forecast horizon adjusted CCI does not have explanatory power on 
any of the returns as seen in Table 14. Adjusted ESI, on the other hand, retains its 
explanatory power on the large value index returns on 10% significance level. An 
increase in ESI decreases the subsequent monthly returns on the large value index by 
0,3 %. Schmeling (2009) finds that the impact of sentiment on future stock returns 
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decreases with forecast horizon. The same effect is present here: When the forecast-
horizon is extended to three months, the forecasting power of CCI disappears 
completely and ESI shows only weak forecasting ability on the returns of large value 
index. The returns that ESI seems to affect consistently are the returns on the large 
value index.  
 
 
Table 14. Index returns regressed on adjusted CCI (Panel A) and ESI (Panel B) with a three-month 
forecast horizon. Bold entities represent statistical significance at 10% level or less. The standard errors 
are estimated with HAC Newey-West procedure (Newey-West automatic bandwidth and lag length). * 
Statistically significant at 10% level, ** Statistically significant at 5% level,*** Statistically significant at 
1 % level. 
  
Panel A 
   
Panel B 
  
  
c 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑡−3 R2 c 𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑡−3 R2 
 
 
Growth 0,001 -0,001 0,00 0,000 0,001 0,00 
 
  
(0,07) (-0,62) 
 
(0,04) (0,68) 
  
 
Large -0,002 -0,001 0,00 -0,002 0,000 0,00 
 
  
(-0,34) (-0,69) 
 
(-
0,34) (0,16) 
  
 
Large 
Growth -0,001 -0,001 0,00 -0,001 0,002 0,01 
 
  
(-0,13) (-0,47) 
 
(-
0,12) (1,02) 
  
 
Large 
Value 0,001 -0,002 0,01 0,001 -0,003** 0,02 
 
  
(0,18) (-1,16) 
 
(0,18) (-1,98) 
  
 
OMXH 0,003 -0,002 0,01 0,003 0,000 0,00 
 
  
(0,51) (-1,11) 
 
(0,47) (-0,21) 
  
 
Small 0,008 -0,003 0,02 0,008 -0,002 0,02 
 
  
(1,26) (-1,57) 
 
(1,21) (-1,58) 
  
 
Small 
Growth 0,004 -0,002 0,01 0,003 -0,002 0,01 
 
  
(0,49) (-1,15) 
 
(0,46) (-0,91) 
  
 
Small 
Value 0,010 -0,003 0,03 0,009 -0,003 0,03 
 
  
(1,44) (-1,62) 
 
(1,38) (-1,59) 
  
 
Value 0,003 -0,002 0,01 0,003 -0,002 0,01 
 
  
(0,57) (-1,46) 
 
(0,53) (-1,63) 
  
 
 
All in all, the results from the predictive regressions are in line with Brown and Cliff 
(2004), and suggest that sentiment, after controlling for macroeconomic factors, shows 
only weak predictive power on stock returns on short-horizons. Although, an increase in 
sentiment on previous periods seems to have negative impact on returns in subsequent 
periods, the explanatory power is weak in all cases. The negative effect of adjusted 
sentiment appears to be strongest on a two- month forecast horizon. More over the 
results from the predictive regressions are somewhat conflicting: Adjusted Consumer 
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Confidence Index shows weak forecasting power only on returns of the Value Index. 
On a 2-month forecast-horizon however, an increase in adjusted CCI has a negative 
effect on Large Value and Small Value index returns. Thus, there seems to be a lack of 
consistency in the effect, and the negative impact is not more prone for returns on small 
stocks. 
 
The negative effect of adjusted Economic Sentiment Indicator on the index returns 
seems to be stronger compared to adjusted CCI. Nevertheless, the results differ with the 
chosen forecast horizon. As adjusted CCI, adjusted ESI has a negative impact on value 
index returns on a one-month forecast horizon in addition to large value returns. On a 2-
month forecast horizon the negative effect on value returns disappear, but the effect 
remains for large value returns.  Moreover, adjusted ESI shows a negative impact on the 
returns of small index and small value index. When the forecast horizon is extended to 
three months, adjusted ESI has a negative impact on the returns of large value stocks. 
Hence, adjusted ESI seems to have negative consistent impact only on the returns of 
large value stocks. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this study was to investigate the impact investor sentiment, measured by 
Consumer Confidence Index and Economic Sentiment Indicator, on stock returns in 
Finnish stock markets. I test whether stocks that are considered speculative are more 
prone to sentiment compared to bond-like stocks. Additionally, the impact of sentiment 
on aggregate stock market returns is tested. In this study, the proxy for aggregate market 
return in Finland is the OMX-Helsinki index. Previous literature suggests that 
confidence measures of sentiment are strongly correlated with macroeconomic 
fundamentals but might also incorporate an irrational component. Following Lemmon 
& Portniaguina (2006) and Chen (2011) both sentiment survey measures were regressed 
on a set of macroeconomic variables in order to distinguish the irrational part of 
sentiment, and to test whether irrational sentiment has any impact on returns of the 
indices. More specifically, if there exists a negative relationship on a short-horizon 
between irrational sentiment and subsequent returns on stocks that are considered 
speculative.  
 
The results show that neither Consumer Confidence Index nor Economic Sentiment 
Indicator has an impact on the aggregate stock market returns. Although, changes in 
Economic Sentiment Indicator are positively correlated with contemporaneous returns 
on OMXH, Consumer Confidence Index does not seem to have any effect on aggregate 
stock market returns. Additionally, results from the Granger-causality test show that 
neither sentiment index granger-causes returns on OMXH. Hence, the results do not 
support the first hypothesis that there would exist a negative relationship between the 
sentiment measures and subsequent aggregate stock market returns. 
 
Previous studies, such as Fisher and Statman (2001, 2003) and Brown & Cliff (2004), 
find a strong positive correlation between stock returns and changes in survey measures 
of sentiment. In line with their findings, I find that contemporaneous changes in both 
sentiment measures are positively correlated with stock returns. However, the 
magnitude of the sentiment effect differs between the two survey measures. 
Contemporaneous changes in CCI as well as changes in CCI in the previous month 
affect only the returns of Small, Small Growth and Small Value indices. Moreover, the 
results from the Granger-Causality test show that CCI granger-causes solely the returns 
of Small and Small growth index. Thus, the second (alternative) hypothesis is accepted 
in the case of Consumer Confidence Index. The results are not as clear for Economic 
Sentiment Indicator: Contemporaneous changes in ESI are positively correlated with all 
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index returns. Unlike changes in CCI, changes in ESI affect the overall market returns - 
OMXH-index. Moreover, a change in ESI in the previous month shows a positive 
impact on Small, Small Growth and Small Value indices, but also negative effect on the 
returns of Large Growth index. On a two-month forecast horizon, a change in ESI has a 
negative impact on returns on the Large Value index. Results from the Granger-
Causality test indicate that the level of ESI granger-causes only the returns of small 
stocks. Hence, although ESI seems to affect also returns on indices that are not 
considered speculative, the impact is stronger and more consistent in the case of 
speculative stocks.  These findings are in line with the second hypothesis. In accordance 
with Fisher and Statman (2000), the changes in the two sentiment proxies show only 
weak forecasting power on the returns of the indices.  
 
After controlling for macroeconomic factors, both of the adjusted sentiment indices 
appear to have negative effects on subsequent returns. This finding might refer to an 
initial overreaction and subsequent correction move, suggested by behavioral theories. 
On a one-month forecast horizon the negative impact of sentiment is significant only for 
the returns of Large Value and Value indices, which are not considered speculative. The 
negative effect of the adjusted sentiment appears to be strongest on a two-month 
forecast horizon. An increase in the level of adjusted ESI decreases returns on the Large 
Value-, Small-, and Small Value indices. Similarly, an increase in adjusted CCI is 
associated with a decrease in returns of Large Value and Small Value indices. On a 
three-month forecast horizon, adjusted CCI does not have any impact on any index 
returns. Adjusted ESI, on the other hand, retains its negative impact on Large Value 
index returns. These findings are partially in line with Schmeling (2009), who finds that 
consumer confidence has a stronger negative relation with value stocks compared to 
growth stocks. However, Schmeling (2009) also finds that small stocks are affected by 
sentiment whereas large stock are not, which is conflicting to my results.  
 
Although, there exists a negative relation between adjusted sentiments and subsequent 
returns on some indices, the findings do not support the third hypothesis that adjusted 
sentiment would primarily affect speculative stocks. Moreover, the R-squares implicate 
that the explanatory power of sentiment on stock returns is relatively trivial. In 
accordance with Brown and Cliff (2004), the results show very little evidence that 
sentiment is capable of predicting stock returns on a short-horizon.  On the other hand, 
the lack of ability to predict the index returns on a short horizon does not mean that 
sentiment would not have any impact on returns. It is possible that the impact of 
sentiment is implemented gradually on the returns, which makes it hard to identify the 
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effect. Hence, for further research, it would be interesting to test if the adjusted 
measures of these sentiment indices have stronger impact on a longer horizon. 
Additionally, one must consider if the negative effect of adjusted sentiments on 
subsequent stock returns stems from actual irrational sentiment, or if there is some 
underlying macroeconomic factor not captured by the model that causes the effect. 
Moller, Norholm, and Rangvid (2014) show that consumer confidence is a strong 
predictor of stock returns, but the information concerning expected returns is due to its 
correlation with the business cycle. Thus, for further research more sophisticated 
models are needed to clarify this matter.   
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APPENDICES  
 
Appendix 1. Economic Sentiment Indicator monthly survey questions 
Reference: European Commission 2016 
 
Type of survey Monthly questions 
Industry  
Production, past 3 months  
Production, next 3 months 
Total order books 
Export order books 
Stocks of finished products Selling prices, next 3 months 
 Firm’s employment, next 3 months 
Construction  
Building activity, past 3 months  
Factors limiting building activity  
 Overall order books 
Firm’s employment, next 3 months  
Selling prices, next 3 months 
 
Retail trade  
Business activity, past 3 months 
Business activity, next 3 months 
Stocks of goods 
Orders placed with suppliers, next 3 months  
Firm’s employment, next 3 months 
Selling prices, next 3 months 
Services  
Business situation, past 3 months 
Demand/Turnover, past 3 months 
Demand/Turnover, next 3 months 
Firm’s employment, past 3 months 
Firm’s employment, next 3 months 
Selling prices, next 3 months 
 
Consumers  
Financial situation, past 12 months 
Financial situation, next 12 months 
General economic situation, past 12 months 
General economic situation, next 12 months 
Consumer prices, past 12 months 
Consumer prices, next 12 months 
Unemployment, next 12 months 
Major purchases of durable consumer goods, current environment Major 
purchases intentions, next 12 months 
Savings, current environment 
Savings intentions, next 12 months 
 75   
 
 
Appendix 2. Consumer Confidence Index monthly survey questions 
The following 17 EU harmonised questions are included in the Consumer Survey each 
month (approximate translations from Finnish): 
1. What is your present economic situation like compared to 12 months ago? 
2. What will your own economic situation be like in 12 months' time compared to 
present? 
3. What is Finland's present economic situation like compared to 12 months ago? 
4. What will Finland's economic situation be like in 12 months' time compared to 
present? 
5. What are the consumer prices like now compared to 12 months ago? 
6. By how many per cent have the consumer prices changed during the last 12 
months? 
7. How will consumer prices change within the next 12 months? 
8. By how many per cent will the consumer prices change during the next 12 
months? 
9. What will be the number of the unemployed in Finland in 12 months' time 
compared to present? 
10. Is it now a favourable or unfavourable time to purchase consumer durables? 
11. Are you going to spend more or less money on consumer durables over the next 
12 months compared to the last 12 months? 
12. Is this a favourable time to save money? 
13. How likely are you to be able to save money within the next 12 months? 
14. What is your household's present financial situation? 
15. How likely is your household to purchase a car within the next 12 months? 
16. Is your household going to purchase or build a dwelling within the next 12 
months? 
17. How likely is your household to spend a large amount of money on basic repairs 
to your dwelling in the next 12 months? 
Besides the EU harmonized questions, some Statistics Finland's own questions are made 
monthly or quarterly. They are the following: 
Statistics Finland' 
1. Is your household planning to buy a new or used car? 
2. How are you going to finance the purchase of the car (two main modes of 
financing)? (quarterly) 
3. How are you going to finance the purchase of the dwelling (two main modes of 
financing)? (quarterly) 
4. Is your household going to use money on the following items within the next 6 
months: dwelling repair and maintenance, home furnishing, holiday home, 
entertainment electronics, household appliances, hobby and sports equipment, 
vehicles (excl. car), holiday travel in Finland, holiday travel abroad? 
5. For what purpose are you saving money? (quarterly) 
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6. How are you going to invest your savings? (quarterly) 
7. Is this a favourable time to raise a loan? 
8. Is your household planning to raise a loan during the next 12 months? 
9. For which purpose are you going to raise a loan? (quarterly) 
10. How likely are you to be thrown into unemployment within the next 12 months? 
11. Which of the following equipment does your household have (25 equipment: 
entertainment electronics, information technology, telephones, car)? (quarterly) 
12. How have you invested your savings (at the moment of the interview)? 
(quarterly) 
Classification items, which characterise the respondent and his or her household, are 
also included in the questionnaire (monthly): 
1. How many members belong to your household? 
2. How many adults/children (4 age groups) are there in your household? 
3. How many of the members of your household go to work regularly? 
4. Which is your municipality of domicile at present? 
5. What is the form of tenure of your household's dwelling? 
6. What is your primary activity at present? 
7. What is your occupation? 
8. Have you had occupational training for your (present) job? 
9. What is the gross income of your household? 
The basic information of the respondent, e.g. age, gender and sample municipality, are 
always found in the original sampling data. In addition, each person's education code is 
drawn from the Register of Completed Education and Degrees. Different regional 
classifications can be formed with the help of the municipality code. 
Reference: Official Statistics of Finland (OSF) 
